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South Africa’s environmental resources are in serious decline, despite the constitutional 
environmental right, and multiple environmental protection laws. A predominant reason for this 
is that the criminal sanction is the default method of environmental enforcement. Even if 
prosecutors succeed in proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the fines imposed are too low 
to deter environmental violations.  
 
This dissertation proposes the introduction of an administrative penalty system into SA 
environmental law, as this system has had positive compliance impacts in numerous 
jurisdictions.  Administrative penalties in the Netherlands and United Kingdom (the roots of 
SA’s civil and common law systems, respectively) are evaluated to identify best practices for 
administrative penalties. 
 
In SA’s environmental regime, there is an ‘administrative fine’ contained in section 24G of the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. This is not a true administrative 
penalty, nor does it comply with the recommended best practices. Section 24G should either 
be deleted or substantially improved to meet its obligation of protecting the environment. 
Given the significant potential of administrative penalties to improve environmental compliance 
and enforcement, practical suggestions are made regarding their introduction into SA 
environmental law as a means to halt the current widespread non-compliance with 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
‘[T]he condition of the South African environment is deteriorating. Increasing pollution and 
declining air quality are harming people’s health. Natural resources are being exploited in an 
unsustainable way, threatening the functioning of ecosystems. Water quality and the health of 
aquatic ecosystems are declining. Land degradation remains a serious problem. Up to 20 
species of commercial and recreational marine fish are considered over-exploited and some 
have collapsed.’1          
 
Recent reports reveal that most of South Africa’s (SA) terrestrial ecosystems, and 
over 80 per cent of its river systems, are threatened.2 The quality and quantity of water 
reserves are declining. This has an adverse impact on human health, exacerbated where 
there is inadequate sanitation. Marine wastewater pollution is escalating. About half of SA’s 
wetlands have been destroyed.3 Alien invasive species are multiplying – aggravating impacts 
on biodiversity and water availability.4 Waste management and access to waste services are 
poor.5 Uncontrolled coastal development poses serious environmental threats.6 Air quality is 
deteriorating, and the population is increasingly being exposed to dangerous ambient pollutant 
concentrations, with their accompanying serious health risks. The negative impacts of climate 
change - for the environment, and for human health and well-being – are mounting.7  
 
This dire situation persists despite the fact that the state is constitutionally obliged to 
ensure environmental compliance and enforcement (EC&E). In addition to a constitutional 
environment right,8 there is a surfeit of environmental legislation compelling compliance with 
                                                     
1     South Africa Environment Outlook (SAEO) 2. 
2  Outcome 10 Delivery Agreement 2,32. 
3  OECD Environmental Performance Reviews 29-30,33,35; Outcome 10 2,10-11,14-15; National Water 
Resource Strategy 2 (GN845 GG36736 of 2013-08-16) ii,7-15,18,25-26,37-42,72,75-79; SAEO 3-4,9,11,28-
30,34-39. 
4  OECD Performance 31-32; Outcome 10 2,13; SAEO 10-14,24-27,30-31,35-39; National Biodiversity Strategy 
and Action Plan 2-3,13-27; National Biodiversity Framework (GN813 GG32474 of 2009-08-03) vii,15-23,37-
40,42,50-54; National Biodiversity Assessment 2-17,31-35,47-58,61-62,65-93,98-146. 
5  OECD Performance 34; DEA Strategic Plan 2012-2017 15; Outcome 10 10,12,30; SAEO 34-35,38; National 
Waste Management Strategy (GN344 GG35306 of 2012-05-04) 15.  
6  DEA Strategic Plan 2012-2017 16; OECD Performance 22-23; SAEO 38. 
7  OECD Performance 23,33; Outcome 10 2,10-11,13,24,29; SAEO 4-7,10,24-25,32-39. 
8  S.24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 guarantees everyone the rights to an 





and facilitating enforcement of section 24 - the environment right in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). The National Environmental Management Act 
107 of 1998 (NEMA) is the framework legislation for environmental protection.9 NEMA and the 
various specific environmental management Acts (SEMAs),10 are among the ‘reasonable 
legislative measures’ for environmental protection envisaged by the environment right.  
 
The combination of widespread non-compliance with legislation designed to protect 
the environment, and the poor enforcement of these laws11 mean that constitutional rights are 
not being realised, and environmental governance is subverted.12 This is so even though 
NEMA contains several provisions intended to make the criminal sanction more effective.13 
Several commentators argue that this poor EC&E is partly because criminal sanctions 
imposed by criminal courts are the default enforcement measure of SA’s environmental 
authorities.14 This dissertation advocates the use of an administrative penalty system – with 
                                                                                                                                                      
legislative and other measures that: prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and 
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources, while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.  
9  Glazewski ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Law 7-6; van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Management 197; Du 
Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 379. 
10  Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (ECA); National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA); National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (PAA); National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA); National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004; 
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008; National 
Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008; and World Heritage Convention Act 49 of 1999. 
11  2011-12 National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 2; SAEO 14-15,22,29; Kidd & Retief 
‘Environmental Assessment’ in Environmental Management 995;  Craigie et al ‘Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 89,95-96; Fourie 2009 
(16)2 SAJELP 95,97-102; Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 265; 
Svatikova Economic Criteria for Criminalization xiv,39-42,108-109,145; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl 
Envtl Law Review 241-242,244-245,247.      
12  Feris 2010 (13)1 PER 77; Kotze ‘Environmental Governance Perspectives’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 108-109; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting Environmenal Compliance&Enforcement’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 45-47; Paterson&Kotze ‘Effective Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 374,376; Müller ‘Environmental 
Governance’ in Environmental Management 94,96. 
13  Damage from environmental crimes and rehabilitation costs are recoverable from polluters (s.34). Offenders 
can be ordered to: repay the financial advantage (and investigation and prosecution costs); or remediate. 
Employers and company directors who fail to take reasonable preventative steps are presumed criminally 
liable for their employees’ or company’s environmental crimes. Courts may: withdraw authorisations; 
disqualify offenders (s.34C); and order forfeiture (s34D). Part of a fine can be paid to anyone whose evidence 
led to conviction (s.34B). S.34G provides for admission of guilt fines. 
14  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95-96,126-127; Bosman & Boyd 2008 INECE Proceedings 493-494; Kidd 2002 
(9)1 SAJELP 21,50; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 254,281,285;  Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 3,5; Better 
Regulation Executive (BRE) Sanctioning post-Hampton 3,13,22; Macrory Regulatory Justice (Macrory 
Report) 7,14,18; Macrory 2009(11) ELR 69-71; Macrory Consultation Document 5,12,35,43-44; Macrory 





non-criminal fines generally imposed by administrative officials15 - as a tool to help resolve 
SA’s EC&E woes.  
 
Compliance with laws depends on the risk of being caught and convicted, and on the 
severity of punishment imposed,16 all of which are currently minor in SA environmental law. 
Environmental crime is both under-investigated and under-prosecuted.17 If an offence is 
detected and a decision made to prosecute, the prosecutor must prove the violator’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal court.18 Even if this onerous burden of proof is met and a 
fine is imposed, it is generally far too low to deter non-compliance - particularly when the 
benefits of breaking the law are significant.19 
 
This is supported by statistics in the National Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement Reports (NECERs) released annually by the Department of Environmental 
Affairs (DEA).20 NECERs contain details of C&E action taken by the Environmental 
Management Inspectorate (EMI) – a network of environmental enforcement officials. The EMI 
has wide-ranging investigative,21 inspection,22 enforcement23 and administrative powers24 to 
                                                     
15  Macrory&Woods Environmental Civil Penalties 4,6; Hampton Reducing Administrative Burdens 40; BRE 
Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,17-18,24-25; Macrory Report 38,41,43,45; Svatikova Criminalization 
39,85,107,109,145; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 256,259,282; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 37,39; INECE 
Principles Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 65; fn.66. 
16  Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 241-242; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 860,877; 
Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1186-1188; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 99,105; Babbitt et al 2004(15) DELPF 
39-40,46; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 5,14-15; Svatikova Criminalization 108-109,181; OECD 
Administrative Fines 9-10; fn.55,156-157,161. 
17  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95;98-99; Kidd Environmental Law 269-270,272-273; Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 98; Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 306; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 242-243; 
Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 258-259,281-282; fn.91-92. 
18  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,120,124; Svatikova Criminalization 109; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 
259,282; INECE Principles 71-72; Davis 2010 Acta Juridica 412,415. 
19  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,97—103,105,127; Babbitt et al 2004(15) DELPF 3,44-45,47-48,54,63; 
Svatikova Criminalization xiv,39-42,108-109,145,182; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 12,14; BRE Sanctioning post-
Hampton 3 5-6,14-15,21-22; Macrory Report 14-16,20-24,54; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law 
Review 241-242,249; DEFRA Review of Enforcement 3,5,14; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 3-6;  Pedersen 2013 
76(2) MLR 322-324,343; Hampton Reducing Burdens 6,9,38-41; Macrory Consultation 14-15,17,26,29-
32,36-38,41,48,60. 
20  2010-11 NECER 10; 2011-12 NECER 11,13-14. 
21  S.31H. 
22  S.31K. 
23  S.31J,s31H(5). 





monitor and enforce compliance with NEMA and/or the SEMAs.25 Although the EMI has made 
some progress in improving poor EC&E, issues like: intersecting (and sometimes conflicting) 
mandates; difficulty ensuring coordination with other government departments; the fact that 
certain legislation falls outside of the inspectors’ mandate; resource constraints; and the vast 
extent of environmental non-compliance – including by government - undermine its 
effectiveness.26  
 
For instance, the NECERs indicate that, despite several arrests for environmental 
offences, conviction rates are low. The 2010-11 NECER27 reveals that the conviction rate was 
a dismal 9.75 per cent.28 In the following year, it was only 7.59 per cent,29 and the conviction 
rate reflected in the 2012-13 NECER30 was extremely low – 4.7 per cent.31 The 2011-12 
NECER also contains what it calls ‘highlights of court sentences obtained’. That these are 
regarded as ‘highlights’ illustrates how low criminal penalties are.32 In 2012-13, 49 
administrative fines were issued in terms of section 24G of NEMA (s24G) with a total value 
paid of R5 385 215.33 As evidence that current enforcement efforts are not an effective 
deterrent, the NECERs demonstrate that many violators are repeat offenders and/or remain in 
non-compliance, despite enforcement action against them.34  
                                                     
25  S.31B-31D,s31G(1)(a) NEMA; Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 54-56,65-66,68; Kidd Environmental Law 278; van der 
Linde ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Management 216-217; Glazewksi et al ‘Compliance’ in Environmental Law 
26-14,26-29,26-37-26-39; Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 88-94; 
Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement  372. 
26  Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 66,90,94-96,101-102; Fourie 2009 
(16)2 SAJELP 98-99; Kotze ‘Perspectives’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 113; Glazewski et al 
‘Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-30. 
27  10. 
28  There were 1988 arrests and 738 criminal dockets registered with the South African Police Service. Of the 
234 cases handed to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), it declined to prosecute 21. There were 72 
convictions, 19 plea bargains and 22 acquittals. To calculate the conviction rate, I divided the number of 
convictions by the number of criminal dockets. 
29  2011-12 NECER 11. There were 1339 arrests and 1080 criminal dockets registered. 201 cases were handed 
to the NPA, and it declined to prosecute 20 of these. 82 offenders were convicted, 13 entered into plea 
bargains, and there were seven acquittals. 
30  9. 
31  There were 1818 arrests and 1488 registered criminal dockets - of which 268 were handed to the NPA. The 
NPA declined to prosecute 37 of these.  There were eight acquittals, 70 convictions and 14 plea bargains. 
32  13-14. For instance: six months’ imprisonment (suspended for three years) was imposed for illegal hunting 
inside a protected area; and R3000 was imposed for the illegal dumping of medical waste. 
33  10. There were 58 such fines, with R8 364870 paid in 2010-11 and 86 fines with R17 627233 paid in 2011-
12. 
34  Non-compliances by the following facilities have annually been recorded in the NECERs since 2009-10: 
Sasol’s Secunda Refinery, Mpumalanga (25,40,36,36); Engen’s Refinery, Kwa-Zulu Natal (25,41,37,37); 





The deficiencies of the current enforcement measures are not the only problems with 
SA’s C&E efforts. Another serious challenge is C&E’s fragmented nature. Environmental 
authorities from different government spheres have overlapping mandates and can use 
various environmental measures in different contexts.35  This is compounded by legislative 
fragmentation. As well as there being national, provincial and local laws all dealing with similar 
issues, there are also multiple cross-sectoral Acts applicable to activities.36 Inadequate 
communication and cooperation between different government spheres and departments and 
within department means that this fragmented structure can result in duplication, conflict, 
inconsistencies, turf protection, bureaucracy, inaction, excessive governance costs, a lack of 
accountability and uncoordinated enforcement actions.37 
  
Government’s substantial resource constraints – both human and financial – have 
also seriously hindered C&E endeavours. Many officials lack the required capacity and skills 
for effective C&E. Staff turnover is also high. The dearth of skills and capacity is most dire in 
local government.38 This is of particular concern, given that municipalities have been entrusted 
with several important environmental functions.39 
                                                                                                                                                      
Steel, Mpumalanga (26,42,39,38-39); BHP Billiton Metalloys Meyerton, Gauteng (27,43-44,42,41); Xtsrata 
Wonderkop, North West (28,43,41,40); Mondi Richard’s Bay, Kwa-Zulu Natal (26,52-53,58,62). 
35  National government has executive authority over ‘marine resources’, ‘mining’, and ‘fresh water resources’. 
‘Environment’, ‘pollution control’, ‘air pollution’, and ‘water and sanitation services’ (potable water supply 
systems, domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems) are areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence (ss.44,85,104,125,Sch.4 Constitution). Municipalities have executive 
authority over ‘air pollution’ and ‘water and sanitation services’ (s.156(1),Sch.4,5 Constitution). ‘Cleansing’, 
‘refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal’ are areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
competence, which municipalities have the right to administer. Local government competence is subject to 
the other spheres’ oversight (ss.104,125,156(1),156(6)(a),155(7),Sch.5 Constitution). 
36  For instance, instead of a comprehensive Act addressing pollution in an integrated manner, several laws 
apply - administered by different authorities.   
37  Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 65-68, 87,96,100-101; Müller 
Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Management 68,80,83,92,95; Kotze ‘Environmental 
Governance Perspectives’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 110-117,124-125; van Zeben 
2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 242. 
38  Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 95-96,101-102; Paterson&Kotze 
‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 371-374,376-377,379; Kotze 
‘Perspectives’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 116-117,125; Müller Environmental Governance’ 
in Environmental Management 91,94,96; Du Plessis&Nel ‘Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 262,274; 
Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 383,385,394; Babbit et al 2004(15) 
DELPF 43,45; Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 306-
307,334-335; Macrory Regulation 13,24; fn.82-83,88. 






These C&E problems are not unique to SA.40 To try to curb the severe decline in the 
state of the environment, law and policy-makers across the globe have been introducing 
innovative C&E measures as alternatives to the criminal sanction.41 Several other 
jurisdictions42 have established administrative penalties, which have, in many cases, had a 
positive impact on legislative compliance.43 An administrative penalty system is also 
successfully used in terms of SA’s Competition Act 89 of 1998 (Competition Act).44 
 
 Currently, apart from NEMA’s ‘administrative fine’ paid in terms of s24G for the 
consideration of an application for retrospective authorisation of an illegally-commenced 
activity,45 SA environmental law does not contain an administrative penalty system. This 
dissertation seeks to critically explore the merits of and possibilities for promoting the 
extended use of adminstrative penalties in SA environmental law to complement existing 
criminal, administrative and judicial measures; and, generally, as an alternative to the criminal 
sanction. 
 
Chapter 2 considers C&E theory, and the available tools.46 It also addresses the 
challenges of traditional C&E mechanisms - specifically the criminal sanction - and the 
                                                     
40  Fn.11-12,14,17-19,37-38. 
41  Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 296-329,307-313,334-335; 
Lehmann ‘Voluntary’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 269-272,275,294; Nel&Wessels 2010 (13)5 
PER 48-49,71; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 21,26,28-50; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 52-53,55,58; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-46-26-47; 
Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1183-1186,1267; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 
242,245,247-249; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 323-324,328-329; Macrory Consultation 4-5,13,29,44,60; Du 
Plessis&Nel ‘Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 261-263,266,270,273-275; Du Plessis ‘Environmental 
Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 380,383-385,387-389,392-398. 
42  Including United States, Canada, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, 
Mexico, Peru, Equatorial Guinea, UK, Netherlands, Australia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Belarus. 
43  BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 16-19; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 94-97,103-104,124-126; Kidd 2002 (9)1 
SAJELP 37-38; DEFRA Review 4,6,28,30; Hampton Reducing Burdens 38,40-41; Macrory Consultation 6-
7,18,45-50; Svatikova Criminalization 3,20,24,39,85-86,106,110,183,185; Macrory&Woods Penalties 4-
5,11,19-22,31,38; Macrory Report 22,41-42; Macrory Regulation 13,15-16; fn.156. 
44  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 113-117; Kidd Environmental Law 279. 
45  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 113; Kidd Environmental Law 279; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 237-238. Chap.4 explains why this is not a true administrative 
penalty. 
46  Civil measures - like interdicts - require litigation in civil court and fall outside the scope of this dissertation 
(Kidd Environmental Law 279-280; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 57-





increasing use of administrative penalties. The form and nature of administrative penalties, as 
well as their advantages and shortcomings, are addressed. 
 
Chapter 3 evaluates the use of administrative penalties in the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the Netherlands - which are, respectively, the roots of SA’s common and civil law legal 
systems.  The purpose of examining the contemporary use of administrative penalties in the 
two jurisdictions which form the basis of SA’s legal system, is to distil a set of best practices 
for the application of administrative penalties to SA’s EC&E efforts. 
 
Chapter 4 critically assesses NEMA’s s24G ‘administrative fine’ - currently the only 
so-called administrative penalty in SA’s environmental law - and the recent amendments 
thereto47 - against the possible lessons identified in Chapter 3. Practical suggestions are 
made for SA’s introduction of a true environmental law administrative penalty system. 
 
To ensure consistency in the analysis, the relevant regimes in both Chapters 3 and 4 
are assessed using the following set of themes: the penalty’s nature and extent, and the 
circumstances which must exist before it can be applied; institutional arrangements for its use; 
the decision-making process - including the burden of proof and the factors for consideration 
in calculating the penalty; whether the penalty has an upper limit; the destination of the penalty 
funds; appeal and review procedures; the penalty’s impact on criminal offences; and the 
implications of penalty non-payment. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes by summarising how administrative penalties can potentially 




                                                     






2 CHAPTER 2: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT THEORY 
 
2.1 Compliance and enforcement tools  
C&E mechanisms generally fall within two primary categories: ‘command-and-control’ and 
‘alternative compliance’48 mechanisms.49 Administrative penalties are an example of the 
command-and-control approach, which consists of prescribing legal obligations and 
compelling compliance using various enforcement mechanisms. Such measures are designed 
to: compel legislative compliance; and punish and deter non-compliance.50 These state-
centred measures afford the state some direct control over the regulated community.51  
Examples are criminal, administrative and civil measures.52  
 
Both criminal and administrative measures (in their more traditional forms), are 
considered below, as are some of their inherent difficulties. Administrative penalties are more 
innovative than traditional administrative measures. Since they contain both civil and criminal 
elements, they are regarded as a hybrid sanction.53 This hybridity has the result that, when 
evaluating how best to formulate administrative penalties, lessons can be learned from the 
theory of both criminal and administrative sanctions. 
 
                                                     
48  These are often divided into incentive-based and voluntary measures.  The former can be market-based (tax 
benefits, subsidies, deposit-refunds), regulatory or information-based incentives, and generally reward 
desired conduct. They can also penalise unwanted conduct – means like product taxes, user charges, 
emission and disposal charges impose costs on those who fail to meet required standards. Voluntary 
measures include self-regulatory (co-operative agreements and labelling schemes) and co-regulatory 
measures (environmental management co-operative agreements) for firms to improve environmental 
performance (Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 58-60; Paterson 
‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 297-306,313-329; Lehmann 
‘Voluntary’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 269,272-294; Nel&Wessels 2010 (13)5 PER 49-
53,59-65; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 247-249). 
49  Kidd Environmental Law 268; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 51; Du 
Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 381; Du Plessis&Nel ‘Compliance’ in 
Compliance&Enforcement 259. 
50  Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 26-27; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 51-52; 
Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 381; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown 
Intl Envtl Law Review 246. 
51  Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 297,306; van Zeben 
2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 245-246; INECE Principles 75; OECD Compliance 76. 
52  van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review  246; Kidd Environmental Law 269,278; Craigie et al 
‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 52.  






When considering C&E measures, it is important to evaluate the justifications for 
punishment. The retribution theory is that society’s condemnation of an offender is reflected by 
means of the offender’s punishment. Punishment is regarded as being justly deserved.54 The 
deterrence theory provides both for individual deterrence: in which punishment discourages 
one person from repeating the same wrongdoing, and for general deterrence: in which the 
punishment of one offender serves to deter the general public.55 
 
2.1.1 The criminal sanction 
Fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the criminal court are the default punishment for 
breaching environmental legislation.56 Historically, criminalising conduct has been used to 
express condemnation with the most socially objectionable conduct. But more recently, 
regulatory crimes have been created, several of which are for apparently minor and/or highly 
technical legislative violations.57 Generally, environmental crimes are not regarded as moral 
wrongs, and do not elicit the kind of indignation that would support the retributive theory’s 
reliance on public condemnation.  This is strengthened by the fact that many environmental 
offences are strict liability offences – offenders are held liable in the absence of fault. 
Therefore, most criminal sanctions are intended as a deterrent, rather than for retributive 
purposes.58  
 
For the criminal sanction to be effective in this role, there must be a serious likelihood 
of an offender’s apprehension and conviction, and the imposition of a meaningful sanction.59 
Another integral aspect of deterrence is that C&E action is publicised. In addition to imposing 
                                                     
54  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95-96; Svatikova Criminalization 25-46; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 856,909,912-
913; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-15; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 241. 
55  Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-15; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 856,860-861; Svatikova 
Criminalization 23-24; OECD Compliance 74; Macrory Consultation 30; van Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE 
Proceedings paras.3.2.1,3.3.2; OECD Fines 9; fn.16. 
56  Fn.14. 
57   For instance, a failure to provide: access to accounts (s.151(1)(b) NWA); or information for the national waste 
information system  (s.67(1)(m) Waste Act). 
58  Kidd Environmental Law 270,272-276; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 98,105,109; Svatikova Criminalization 
ix,1,23,37,40-41,109,175; van Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.2.1-3.2.3,3.2.5,5.1,6; OECD 
Fines 9,19; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,13,22,24,26; Macrory Report 7,14,16,18,23,38,47,54; 
Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,6,8,37; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 88,93-94; Babbitt et al 2004(15) DELPF 2-
3,26-29,43,48-50,54-64; DEFRA Review 4,14,22,27-28; Macrory Consultation 5,14-15,17,19,29,33-35,39,43-
44,49-50,54; INECE Principles 76,79-80; Macrory Regulation 12,15,26-29. 





meaningful sanctions, an effective penalty regime must send a strong message to ensure that 
others comply.60 This is illustrated by the popular quote of American diplomat and politician 
Chester Bowles:  
 
‘20 percent of the regulated population will automatically comply with any regulation, 5 
percent will attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent will comply as long as 
they think that the 5 percent will be caught and punished.’61 
 
It is also essential that the punishment fit the crime – if the penalty is too lenient, the 
utility of the criminal sanction as a deterrent is significantly diluted, and the seriousness of 
environmental law violations are minimised. By contrast, if a penalty seems too severe, this 
may result in contempt for the law. Over-zealous prosecution – especially of offenders whose 
non-compliance is inadvertent or the result of strict liability - also deprives criminal sanctions of 
their stigma.62 
 
Because of the stricter criminal procedure and high standard of proof (guilt must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt),63 the public believes that the information about the 
offender’s guilt is reliable. This can attract negative publicity and a loss of reputation – with a 
likely loss of business - for corporate offenders. For individuals, stigma has social and 
economic consequences, as many people avoid interaction with criminal offenders, and a 
criminal record limits ex-offenders’ employment opportunities.  This is particularly so for 
violations which elicit widespread public disapproval. Stigma is an extra cost to the offender, 
which does not draw on government resources .64 Criminal law is also the most coercive form 
of enforcement – the only one that provides for the offender’s incarceration. Imprisonment 
                                                     
60  Svatikova Criminalization 79,109; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 241-242; van 
Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.2.1,3.3.2; OECD Fines 10,25-26,29; INECE Principles 
79,85; Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1225-1226; Macrory Consultation 8,15,22; Macrory Report 
10,35,86,91,97,99,101; fn.412-414. 
61  Bowles Promises to Keep 25. 
62  Fn.16,54-55,57-58,158-159.  
63  Fn.18-19. 
64  Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1187,1221; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 89-90,102; Babbitt et al 2004(15) 
DELPF 1,23,26,47; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 241-242; Svatikova 
Criminalization xv-xvi, 4,26,86,88-91,96,98-100,109,140,144,179-181,186; Waite 2007(24) PELR 353-354; 





incapacitates the offender by removing them from the general population to prevent additional 
harm.65   
 
2.1.2 Administrative measures 
Administrative measures are implemented by relevant environmental authorities and not by 
the courts.66  These officials have specialist expertise and experience.67 Administrative 
measures usually aim to stop unlawful conduct, to ensure compliance with the law and 
authorisation conditions, and/or to compel persons to take corrective actions where their 
conduct harms the environment.68  Because polluters can be directed to remediate 
environmental damage at their own cost, these measures support the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle.69 Where administrators do not wish to seek criminal recourse through the judicial 
system, administrative measures provide a very attractive alternative.70 
 
Administrative measures take many forms;71 can be used in a wide variety of 
circumstances; and are able to regulate activities in fairly specific ways. More than one 
measure may be applicable in a particular context; and often, a range must be applied 
simultaneously. Officials have extensive discretion regarding their use. As a result, 
administrative measures are potentially more efficient than criminal measures.72  
 
                                                     
65  Svatikova Criminalization ix,xiv-xv,2,4,24,26,86-91,98-100,185; van Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE 
Proceedings paras.3.2.1,5.1; INECE Principles 71-72, 9; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 89,102; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 241-242. 
66  Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 54-55; Kidd Environmental Law 278; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 225,238; OECD Compliance 74; fn.15. 
67  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 109,118,122,124; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 911,913; Abbot 2009 (11)1 ELR 45; 
Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 37; INECE Principles 70, Macrory&Woods Penalties 37,39. 
68  Kidd Environmental Law 278-279; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 55; 
OECD Compliance 74; fn.114. 
69  Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 238; fn.114,445. 
70  Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 56; Winstanley ‘Administrative 
Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 225-226; Kidd Environmental Law 278; Glazewski et 
al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-5. 
71  Most prevalent are: directives, abatement notices, compliance notices, and the suspension and withdrawal of 
environmental authorisations. 
72  Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,38; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 55-56; 
Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 225-226,233,238-239; 





They require proof on the less strict civil standard: a balance of probabilities.73 These 
measures are less formal, simpler, more flexible,74 speedier and cheaper than criminal 
measures.75 Another advantage is that non-compliance with administrative measures is a 
criminal offence, and the public can compel environmental authorities to implement 
administrative measures.76 
 
2.1.3 Challenges of traditional compliance and enforcement tools 
There are numerous problems with the criminal sanction - especially insofar as environmental 
law is concerned. In addition to its ‘inherent weaknesses’ (which apply worldwide), there are 
also ‘contingent weaknesses’, that apply particularly to SA and other developing countries.77 
 
Below, the disadvantages of criminal measures (and administrative measures, where 
applicable) are evaluated using a series of themes: the body that implements the measure; 
standard of proof; cost and implementation time; ease of implementation; deterrence impact; 
proportionality; and prevention of environmental harm. 
 
2.1.3.1 Implementing body 
Criminal courts impose criminal penalties after successful prosecution of offenders.78 Because 
of environmental law’s inherent complexities and technical nature, specialist prosecutors are 
                                                     
73  Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,37-39; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 120-121,124; Svatikova Criminalization 20-
21,87,95; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL  253,256,258-259,282; Macrory&Woods Penalties 5,9,11; 
Macrory Report 46-47. 
74  Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,37-38; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 225,234; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 253,255-256,259; Faure ‘Balancing of 
Interests’ in Balancing of Interests 30; Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,11,31; Hampton Reducing Burdens 9,40; 
Macrory Consultation 39,45,49. 
75  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 109,124,126; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 235,238-239; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 253,258,279,282,284; INECE 
Principles 75; Paddock 2011 INECE Proceedings 600; OECD Compliance 75-76; Macrory Consultation 
48,50. 
76  Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-4-26-5,26-9; Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 60-61; Kidd 2002 
(9)1 SAJELP 34,36; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 232-
233,235. 
77  Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 242; Kidd Environmental Law 270. 





often required to argue cases, but there is a lack of such expertise.79 A further obstacle is that, 
generally, judicial officers have not had a lot of exposure to environmental law.80 
 
2.1.3.2 Standard of proof 
A criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is a heavy burden to 
discharge.81 
 
2.1.3.3 Cost and implementation time 
The time-consuming nature and expense of prosecution are among the criminal sanction’s 
inherent weaknesses. It is extremely resource-intensive (both in terms of financial and human 
resources) for enforcement agencies to prepare cases for prosecution and ensure that 
enforcement officials attend court. Prosecutions can take several years. Enforcement 
resources are limited and the costs can be significant, as extensive investigative powers, 
including those of experts, are required. It is also costly to imprison offenders.82 If too many 
limited enforcement resources are expended on criminal proceedings, these are not available 
for other potentially productive means to address environmental harm.83 
 
2.1.3.4 Ease of implementation  
Regulatory authorities generally cannot mould these measures to suit specific circumstances, 
and the regulated community has no incentive to do more than is necessary to comply with 
                                                     
79  Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1201-1202; Kidd Environmental Law 270,273; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 98-
99,126; Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 306; van 
Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.3.5,5.1; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 6; OECD Performance 
57. 
80  BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 14,22,26; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,101,109,118,126; Craigie et al 
‘Institutions’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 99,101; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 259,283; 
Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 5; Macrory Consultation 25,32,48; Macrory Regulation 28. 
81  Fn.18-19.  
82  Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-15,26-46; Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1213-
1214,1225; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 93,104; Babbit et al 2004(15) DELPF 42-43,45; Svatikova 
Criminalization ix;xiv-xvi,2,40,87,94,98-99,105,108-109,179,181; Kidd Environmental Law 270-272; BRE 
Sanctioning post-Hampton 3,5,13,22; Macrory Report 14,16,18,23; Macrory Consultation 14-17,29,34-35,44-
45,48-49; Davis 2010 Acta Juridica 412-413,423; INECE Principles 71-72,79; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 
322,328; Macrory Regulation 24,28,30; fn.38. 
83  Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,19,37-38,42; Paddock 2011 INECE Proceedings 601; Svatikova Criminalization 





the law. This means that such measures do not encourage industry to undertake voluntary 
initiatives or meet stricter environmental standards than legislated.84 
 
Environmental crime is under-investigated and under-prosecuted.85 Many cases are 
dismissed – for policy or technical grounds, or because the prosecutor takes the view that it is 
not in the public interest to prosecute.86 Courts have a heavy workload, and SA’s criminal 
justice system is already significantly overburdened with serious criminal cases.87 The 
obstacles presented by the accused’s procedural safeguards are another inherent weakness 
and worsen the time and cost burden.88 Contingent weaknesses of criminal law include: 
ineffective policing;89 insufficient public awareness of environmental law and co-operation with 
the criminal process;90 and the challenges of investigation.91 
 
Since it is difficult to obtain a criminal conviction and an appropriate penalty, 
authorities are discouraged from prosecuting environmental crimes. This sustains the poor 
prosecution rate, resulting in a compliance deficit. Officials are, as a result, also denied the 
opportunity to improve their practical investigative and prosecution skills.92   
 
A possible disadvantage of the discretion given to officials to impose administrative 
measures is that there is no control over whether the official will do so.93  In order to be 
effective, implementing officials require appropriate training. Successful implementation 
                                                     
84  Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,37; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 52; 
Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 53; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 246-247,249. 
85  Fn.17. 
86  Fn.18. 
87  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,118,124-126; Svatikova Criminalization 40,109; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 
JEL 259,283; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 13. 
88  Kidd Environmental Law 271-272; Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 375,378; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 243-247. 
89  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 99; Kidd Environmental Law 272-273. 
90  Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 55,61; Paterson&Kotze 
‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 373,375; Kidd Environmental Law 
273. 
91  Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 243; van Zeben&Mulkey 1992 INECE 
Proceedings para.4.1; fn.17-19,79. 
92  Fn.17-19. 
93  Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 56; Winstanley ‘Administrative 






depends on administrative capacity – which is currently quite poor. The political will to make 
these measures successful is also essential.94 
 
2.1.3.5 Deterrence impact 
The widespread non-compliance with environmental law makes it clear that the criminal 
sanction and traditional administrative measures are not an effective deterrent.95  Inadequate 
penalties are another contingent weakness. Where sanctions are imposed for environmental 
offences, these are, generally, too insignificant to amount to a serious deterrent. This problem 
is exacerbated by the low detection probability and the large financial benefit that can result 
from non-compliance with environmental legislation.96 This results in perverse incentives for 
the regulated community to violate the law.97  
 
2.1.3.6 Proportionality 
Another weakness of criminal law is the reluctance to penalise wrongdoers for actions not 
regarded as moral wrongs (with priority being given to ‘real crimes’). In relation to regulatory 
offences, criminal prosecution may, in any event, be disproportionate.98   
 
2.1.3.7 Prevention of environmental harm 
Command-and-control measures are not aimed at preventing or repairing environmental 
harm. This harm has already been done by the time the prosecution is instituted: criminal law 
is reactive. This is contrary to the aim of environmental law: to protect the environment.99 
Because criminal law is usually plant or medium-specific, it fails to regulate cross-media and 
cumulative effects on the environment appropriately. Crucial demand-side management 
                                                     
94  Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 226,239; Paterson&Kotze 
‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 376; INECE Principles 77; fn.38. 
95  Fn.11-12,17-19,27-34. 
96  Fn.16-19.  
97  BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 5; Macrory Report 20,54; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 284; Hampton 
Reducing Burdens 38-39; Macrory Consultation 29-30; OECD Fines 10; Paterson&Kotze 
‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 375. 
98  Fn.57-58.  
99  Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 54-55; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in 
Environmental Law 26-28-26-29,26-46; Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance&Enforcement 375-376; Waite 2007(24) PELR 354. This has been ameliorated to some extent by 





considerations are neglected, because criminal law focuses on controls relating to supply. 
Having stricter control over demand and consumption is essential, given the fast-depleting 
natural resources. Criminal law does not correct market failure so as to take consideration of 
environmental goods and services like water, soil, air, fauna and flora.100  
 
In his evaluation of regulatory sanctions for the UK, Richard Macrory determined six 
‘Penalties Principles’ as the source of any sanctioning regime. Sanctions should aim to: 
change the offender’s behaviour; eliminate non-compliance benefits; be responsive, taking 
into account what is appropriate for the particular offender and the circumstances; be 
proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm; include an element of restoration; and 
deter future non-compliance.101 For the reasons set out above, the criminal sanction largely 
fails to address these aims in relation to environmental law violations. Although traditional 
administrative measures have fewer of the deficiencies of criminal measures, a common 
criticism of these measures is that they lack ‘teeth’.102  
 
It has been argued that criminal sanctions should be reserved for serious 
infringements that demand significant punishment – for instance where there is intentional 
and/or continued wrongdoing, and/or where the conduct of the offender has resulted in serious 
damage to humans or the environment. Criminal prosecution for environmental offences 
should be used as a last resort.103  
 
Due to the many disadvantages of the command-and-control methods - particularly 
the criminal sanction - alternative compliance mechanisms104 are increasingly being used – 
either as an alternative, or in conjunction with criminal measures.105  Despite being a 
                                                     
100  Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 307; fn.1-7. 
101  Macrory Consultation 8,19-20; OECD Fines 9; Macrory Report 10,27-31,35. 
102  Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 376. 
103  Kidd 2002 21-27,50;  Kidd Environmental Law 269,274-277; Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in 
Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 375; Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 67-68; INECE Principles 71-72,74-75; 
Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 94-95,104-105; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 254,258,282,285; Waite 
2007(24) PELR 354-355; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 13,18,22-23; Macrory Report 18,38,42,47,98; 
OECD Compliance 74-75,84-85; DEFRA Review 4,6,28-29,53; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 3-4,6; Hampton 
Reducing Burdens 9,39-40; Macrory Consultation 7,13-14,16-18,30,35,37-38,43-44,48-49. 
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command-and-control measure, administrative penalties are able to negate various 
disadvantages of the more traditional of these measures.   
 
2.2 Administrative penalties 
The nature and form of administrative penalties is considered below. Thereafter, the pros and 
cons of administrative measures are evaluated, using the same themes as in 2.1.3 above. 
 
2.2.1 Nature and form of administrative penalties 
Administrative penalties – sometimes called civil penalties106 - are another type of 
administrative measure and the focus of this dissertation. In general, these are monetary 
penalties imposed by the regulator, without the intervention of the courts.107 However, in some 
jurisdictions – like the United States (US) – administrative penalties are imposed by an 
independent tribunal. In this case, the system is still administered by environmental officials.108  
 
Administrative penalties have been described as a hybrid sanction, as they have both 
criminal and civil law elements. The resemble criminal law fines because they are financial 
and punitive in nature, but the process in which they are imposed is civil.109 Given the lower 
standard of proof required for administrative penalties – a balance of probabilities110 - and the 
stigma111 and coercive nature112 of criminal prosecution, administrative penalties should be 
used for environmental law violations that are not egregious enough to warrant criminal 
prosecution.113 
 
                                                     
106  Some authors use these terms interchangeably; others distinguish civil from administrative penalties, in that 
the former use the existing civil court structure and rules, and the latter require specialised institutions (Lynott 
2010 (17)1 IPELJ 12; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 118; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 43-46). Others regard the 
latter as fixed penalties imposed by a regulator without discretion to assess the amount, and civil penalties as 
discretionary monetary sums imposed under criminal law (Macrory&Woods Penalties 11). In this dissertation, 
‘administrative penalties’ refer to monetary penalties imposed under the civil law by regulators.  
107  Fn.15,66.  
108  Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,118. 
109  Fn.53. 
110  Fn.73. 
111  Fn.64. 
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Administrative penalties aim to enforce administrative regulation by punishing non-
compliance, deterring violations and creating incentives for the regulated community to 
improve its compliance. They support the ‘polluter pays’ principle as they aim to: eliminate any 
monetary advantage from non-compliance with legislation; secure the remediation and 
recover the costs of environmental damage; and be proportionate to the nature of the offence 
and the resulting harm.114 Ideally, they should also make restitution to adversely affected 
communities.115 Administrative penalties should also take into account what is appropriate for 
the particular issue and the offender.116 
 
These penalties can be structured to provide for both fixed and variable monetary 
penalties.  This provides more flexibility and allows penalties to be more proportionate to the 
violation.117  Fixed monetary penalties (FMPs) are automatic, non-discretionary, relatively low 
monetary amounts imposed for technical regulatory or otherwise minor offences that do not 
result in substantial financial gain or serious environmental consequences. The penalties are 
‘fixed’, because the relevant legislation sets out the circumstances in which a breach has 
occurred, as well as the penalty amount or the method to calculate it.  There is no discretion 
as to the level of the penalty, but the regulator does have discretion as to the penalty’s 
imposition.118 Although they can more easily avoid the concerns attendant on a regulator’s 
discretion, FMPs cannot accommodate issues of mitigation and aggravation.119  
 
By contrast, a variable monetary penalty (VMP) is for larger amounts, determined at 
the regulator’s discretion, with reference to a published scheme. Legislation may set out a 
range of factors to consider in determining the penalty; alternatively, detailed guidelines may 
be developed. A maximum penalty may be specified in legislation, but there is not always an 
upper limit. Generally, VMPs would be for negligent breaches of environmental legislation; 
alternatively for ‘innocent’ breaches resulting in significant financial gain and/or substantial 
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external consequences.120  Notice of the possible penalty imposition is provided, as is an 
opportunity to make representations. Having considered the representations, the regulator can 
impose a VMP.121 
 
Administrative penalties are more representative of the level of economic advantage, 
and the severity of the non-compliance. In determining the penalty, the regulator must 
consider a publicly available set of criteria, including mitigating and aggravating factors like: 
the circumstances of the non-compliance; the seriousness of the violation; the regulatory 
importance of the requirement violated; the offender’s degree of fault; vicarious liability for 
employees’ failures and whether the employee was acting within their authority; the level of 
the offender’s cooperation with the enforcement authority; the expected or actual gain from the 
non-compliance; the violator’s history of non-compliance;  regulators’ previous enforcement 
actions; the firm’s size; the violator’s ability to pay the penalty; the duration of the non-
compliance; the conduct of the business after the non-compliance came to the regulator’s 
attention; and whether the offence was voluntarily reported in a timely and accurate 
manner.122 
 
The recipient of an administrative penalty can appeal to an independent tribunal if the 
imposition and/or the amount of the penalty is disputed. This tribunal should be staffed by 
members with specialist environmental law expertise.123 
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2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of administrative penalties 
2.2.2.1 Implementing body 
A major advantage of an administrative penalty system is that environmental officials124 – who 
are familiar with environmental legislation and the effect of environmental violations – 
administer the system and impose the fines. They have particular expertise and understand 
the sanctions expected to result in compliance.  These officials are also better acquainted with 
the technological aspects of the regulated entity, and the offender’s personal circumstances.  
They are therefore well-placed to consider all relevant information when deciding if an 
administrative penalty is appropriate; and, in the case of a VMP, its extent.125  
 
If someone is aggrieved by the imposition of an administrative penalty, they can 
challenge it in a higher tribunal which has specialised expertise in the subject matter. The 
appeal tribunal’s clearer understanding of the issues is likely to result in fairer outcomes.126 
Appeals also do not have to compete with other cases in the already overloaded court 
system.127 
 
2.2.2.2 Standard of proof 
Another significant benefit of the system is that there is generally no need to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt (the criminal standard) before imposing a penalty, but on a 
balance of probabilities (the civil standard).128 As a result, monitoring regulatory requirements 
like those in environmental authorisations is less demanding than for a criminal case.129 
 
2.2.2.3 Cost and implementation time 
Administrative penalties are less resource-intensive than criminal proceedings in terms of 
time, finances and personnel.130  However, the enforcement costs of administrative law 
include the costs of inspection and evidence-collection – which are incurred irrespective of 
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whether a violation is found. A lack of human, monetary and technical resources for 
inspections will impact negatively on an administrative penalty system.131 The flip-side is that a 
credible and effective enforcement system requires fewer inspections of compliant 
businesses.132 
 
2.2.2.4 Ease of implementation 
Administrative penalties have simpler procedural requirements, are less formal, and are easier 
to administer and impose than criminal penalties.133 The administrative penalty system also 
makes it easier to determine the optimal punishment level.134 
 
In an administrative penalty system, more complaints are lodged for adjudication or 
settlement, more environmental violations are pursued, and more fines are imposed. 
Administrative penalties are flexible – allowing both for a more personalised approach to 
regulatory non-compliance, and a more proportional response to environmental breaches.135 
Because the system provides a meaningful, transparent and consistent regulatory response to 
violations, the regulated community knows where it stands.136 As a result, administrative 
penalties promote fairness. They can remove the economic advantage of non-compliance – 
like a business’s avoided costs of operation and maintenance, as well as the profits from 
postponed expenditure (like the time, value or money accrued as a result of industries not 
installing required equipment or infrastructure).137 Industries that incur the costs required to 
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comply with environmental legislation support the penalisation of those competitors that obtain 
an unfair advantage from non-compliance.138 
 
Enforcement authorities have much greater control over administrative proceedings 
than criminal prosecutions.139 Because violations do not have to be sent to the public 
prosecutor or argued in court, the burden on state attorneys, police services, public 
prosecutors and criminal courts is reduced, and environmental cases do not have to compete 
with other crimes in the criminal justice system.140  
 
Since administrative penalties do not have the risk, negative publicity, loss of 
reputation and stigma of criminal prosecution, nor the threat of a criminal record, offenders are 
also less likely to dispute such penalty than a criminal fine.141 It is also so that criminal 
prosecution is clearly not the appropriate response for all violations of environmental 
legislation: certain breaches do not ‘deserve’ the stigma and adverse publicity of a criminal 
offence.142 In any event, because criminal prosecution of environmental law is limited, the 
stigmatic impacts and loss of reputation associated with a criminal sanction are often 
theoretical.143   
 
Officials’ successsful use of administrative penalties enhances their reputation, which 
is likely to increase compliance.144 Administrative penalties can also provide more funds 
towards the fiscus.145 Although administrative penalties cannot ‘incapacitate’ offenders and 
remove them from society in the way that imprisonment can, an ‘incapacitation’ effect is 
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available by suspension or withdrawal of licences. This has been held to be the corporate 
counterpart of imprisonment.146 
 
A disadvantage of the system is that, because they have similar aims, administrative 
penalties sometimes have some of the same safeguards for offenders as those in the criminal 
system. An administrative penalty may be regarded as a ‘criminal charge’, entitling an offender 
to the rights in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.147 But important procedural differences remain between the two 
systems.148 As long as the model applied incorporates safeguards proportional to the nature of 
the penalty system, the benefits of avoiding the burdensome criminal procedural requirements 
can be retained. The emphasis is on the true nature of the proceedings and not their form.149  
 
A further downside of administrative penalties is that court judgements have a greater 
precedent value than administrative penalty decisions. However, where the imposition of a 
penalty is resisted, the matter will, in any event, end up in a higher tribunal like a court.150 
 
In relation to those jurisdictions where there are currently no administrative penalties – 
such as in SA’s environmental legislation – enabling legislation and new policies and 
procedures would need to be introduced. The need to establish new institutions - or expand 
existing institutions – is the primary disadvantage to the introduction of an administrative 
penalty system. New staff will have to be employed and procedural rules drafted.151 
 
2.2.2.5 Deterrence impact 
Because administrative authorities usually have an ongoing relationship with offenders, 
authorities often follow a compliance strategy; negotiating with offenders instead of 
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prosecuting them. This is based on the assumption that authorities are more likely to achieve 
increased compliance if they adopt a conciliatory rather than a coercive approach. This 
approach is also followed because of the problems inherent in the criminal sanction, and a 
lack of alternative enforcement mechanisms.152  
 
Given the widespread non-compliance with environmental law,153 and the fact that 
many violators are repeat offenders,154 it appears that negotiation is not a sufficient deterrent. 
Compliance strategies often persist for long periods, requiring continuous interaction between 
authorities and offenders.  A credible threat of legal sanction is essential for compliance,155 
and administrative penalties provide this.156  Monetary fines have a strong impact in deterring 
the contravention of environmental legislation; in that potential violators are dissuaded by 
administrative penalties issued, and adjust their behaviour to avoid their imposition. This 
means that administrative penalties play an important role in increased C&E of environmental 
law.157 
 
However, if administrative penalties are not set high enough, businesses may easily 
budget for these fines as part of their operational costs and/or transfer the cost of the fine to 
their shareholders or the public.158 And if the penalty is set too high, it will be perceived as 
unfair, and the offender will spend resources resisting the penalty instead of complying with it. 
Both clearly defeat the deterrent and punitive goals of administrative penalties.159 
 
Another shortcoming of any monetary sanction is that it is only effective to the extent 
of the offender’s assets.  Administrative penalties are inappropriate where offenders do not 
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have the means to pay.160 The deterrence impact is limited when the benefits of non-
compliance are high, substantial harm is caused by the violation, the probability of detection 
and/or imposing sanctions is low, and/or the offender’s assets are negligible compared to the 
harm. When insolvency is an obstacle, more severe sanctions, like imprisonment, are required 
for appropriate deterrence.161 The more significant the harm, the more society values 
deterrence, and is prepared to bear the costs of imprisonment.162   
 
It has been proposed that an option to resolve the insolvency problem is to raise the 
probability of detection and thereby decrease the severity of the sanction required for optimal 
deterrence. However, it might not be possible to increase the likelihood of detection cheaply 
enough.163 Another option is to arrange for payment in instalments, or to consider alternatives 
to monetary payment – such as a violator’s donation of time and effort for voluntary 
improvements to environmental quality, or participation in environmental awareness media 
campaigns.164 Where the imposition of the fine would result in an extreme financial burden - 
with results like insolvency or closure of the business - and there is determined to be an 
important public interest for the firm to remain in business, a decision could be made to 
impose a smaller fine. This option should only be considered if no alternatives are possible.165 
A reduced penalty should not be imposed in circumstances where the plant is likely to close 
down in any event, or will probably persist with its non-compliance.166 
 
2.2.2.6 Proportionality 
Monetary fines also address circumstances where criminal prosecution is not a fitting 
response to a breach of environmental legislation. In other words, the violation does not 
warrant the moral condemnation and stigma of criminal prosecution - for instance, where there 
is only negligible harm as a result of the violation, or non-compliance was inadvertent.167 
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VMPs promote proportionality as they are imposed by having regard to relevant factors like 
the circumstances of the offence, the economic benefit of the violation, and the environmental 
damage.168  
 
2.2.2.7 Prevention of environmental harm 
In addition to penalising environmental law contraventions, administrative penalties deter 
violations and incentivise improved compliance. They aim to eliminate the benefits of 
violations and remediate environmental harm. Like other administrative measures, they are in 
keeping with the ‘polluter pays’ principle.169 
 
Apart from the NEMA’s s24G administrative fine,170 there are no administrative 
penalties in SA’s environmental law. However, there is quite widespread use of such penalties 
in other jurisdictions.171 Chapter 3 critically evaluates administrative penalties in the 
Netherlands and the UK.  
 
3 CHAPTER 3: DRAWING LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS REGARDING THE 
USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES 
 
This chapter evaluates the use of environmental law administrative penalties in two foreign 
jurisdictions to distil a set of best practices for possible application to SA’s environmental 
regime. The Netherlands and the UK are the roots of SA’s civil and common-law legal 
systems, respectively, and have contemporary experience with administrative penalties. The 
Constitution provides that a forum interpreting constitutional rights may consider foreign 
law,172 and examining these foreign systems provides relevant general lessons for assessing 
SA’s legal system in Chapter 4.  
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To set a context for the critical evaluation, a brief introduction to the regimes is 
provided. Therefafter, the regimes are jointly evaluated using a series of themes, with a view 
to draw possible lessons for the use of administrative penalties to improve SA’s EC&E effort. 
These themes are: the administrative penalties’ nature, trigger and scope; institutional 
arrangements; decision-making processes; maximum quanta; allocation of their proceeds; 
appeal and review procedures; their effect on criminal offences; and non-compliance 
implications. 
 
3.1 Introduction to the regimes 
3.1.1 Netherlands 
The Constitution173 is the framework of Dutch public law (including environmental law).174 
Government must conserve and improve the environment.175 The General Administrative Law 
Act (GALA)176 contains general administrative law provisions177 and deals with the conduct of 
administrative authorities,178 including the Netherlands Emissions Authority (NEA).179 There is 
also constitutional provision for specific administrative courts.180 Most environmental laws are 
enforced via the Economic Offences Act,181 which, together with the Dutch Penal Code,182 
regulate criminal law enforcement.183 The Environmental Management Act (EMA)184 contains 
general environmental provisions,185 and makes provision for the NEA to impose 
administrative penalties when certain emissions trading provisions are violated.186  
 
European Union (EU) law is the primary influence of Dutch environmental law. EU 
directives and regulations apply directly to the Dutch regulatory framework, or are 
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incorporated into national law.187 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the EU188 (Directive) establishes a scheme for Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
allowance trading within the European Community. The Netherlands is subject to GHG-
reduction targets and falls within the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). Emission 
allowances are auctioned or allocated - with each allowance representing the emission of one 
carbon dioxide tonne. Allowances can be traded in the online European Registry (NEA 
manages the Dutch registry section), to enable companies to purchase additional allowances 
to meet their EU ETS obligations.189 Participating businesses and airlines that emit GHGs 
require an emission permit190 and must annually surrender emission allowances (or other 
credits) equivalent to their emissions.191  
 
3.1.2 United Kingdom 
The legal systems of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are based on common law 
principles, and Scottish law is based on civil law principles with common law elements.192  
There is no written constitution - statute law takes precedence.193 The Environment Protection 
Act194 (EPA) (amended by the Environment Act)195 is the primary legislation196 regulating 
emission control and waste management.197 The Environment Agency (EA) is responsible for 
enforcement.198  
 
Following investigations and reports by Philip Hampton and Macrory into alternative 
regulatory and enforcement approaches,199 the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions (RES) 
Act200 came into force in the UK in 2008.201 It empowers EA (and others) to impose various 
civil sanctions - including administrative penalties in the form of both FMPs and VMPs - 
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subject to the introduction of secondary legislation.202 These sanctions were introduced by the 
Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order (ECSO)203 and the Environmental Civil 
Sanctions (Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) Regulations.204 To give effect to these, EA 
published guidance on the use of civil sanctions and enforcement of offences205 by means of 
the 2011 Enforcement and Sanctions Statement and Enforcement and Sanctions Guidance 
(Guidance).206 Civil sanction guidance is provided to regulators by the Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)207 and the Department of Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform.208  
 
The RES Act applies to offences in relation to which EA has an enforcement 
function,209 including illegal water abstraction in terms of the EPA and a failure to furnish 
information in terms of the Water Resources Act (WRA).210   
 
3.2 Lessons to be drawn from the Netherlands and United Kingdom  
3.2.1 Nature of penalty 
The Dutch administrative fine is defined as a punitive sanction, comprising an unconditional 
obligation to pay a sum of money.211 
 
In the UK, FMPs are payments of prescribed monetary penalties.212 FMPs are most 
appropriate for minor offences without direct environmental impacts - where EA’s advice has 
not resulted in the required improvements and a low monetary penalty is more likely to change 
the offender’s conduct.213 VMPs are monetary penalties of amounts EA determines.214 VMP 
are for more serious offences or where there is evidence of negligence or mismanagement. 
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VMP imposition could change the violator’s behaviour, deter others, remove the financial gain 
of non-compliance, and/or result in a quicker resolution.215 
 
It is preferable for an administrative penalty regime to follow the UK system of 
distinguishing between FMPs and VMPs. This allows more flexibility and proportionality as 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances can be considered.216 
 
3.2.2 Trigger for penalty 
The Dutch EMA sets out the offences in relation to which NEA has discretion to impose an 
administrative penalty,217 and those where such fine must be imposed.218 Examples of the 
former are: establishing a facility with GHG installations without NEA’s authorisation,219 and 
contravening an emissions trading220 licence.221 NEA must impose a fine, for example, when 
an airline fails to surrender annual GHG emission allowances at least equal to the total 
emissions in that year from aviation activities (in Annex I to the Directive) from 1 January 2012 
for which that airline is responsible.222  
 
Generally, administrative penalties can only be imposed if the offender is at fault.223  
However, for non-discretionary fine offences, fault is not required.224 An administrative penalty 
cannot be levied if one has previously been imposed on the violator for the same violation.225  
 
In the UK, several laws provide monetary penalties for offences. The WRA provides 
that a FMP or VMP may be imposed, inter alia, for abstracting water without a licence granted 
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by EA.226 A VMP may be imposed for the EPA offence of failing to furnish information in 
compliance with a written notice from the Secretary of State or a waste regulation authority.227 
 
Before a FMP or VMP may be imposed, EA must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that the offence has been committed.228  EA should follow the Penalties Principles229 
when considering appropriate action.230 
 
It is recommended that administrative penalties be available for all environmental 
violations not serious enough to warrant criminal action.231  Strict liability offences should 
generally be reserved for FMPs.232 Contrary to the UK’s position, and because a violator does 
not face criminal prosecution, it is appropriate for the standard of proof for administrative 
penalties and appeals to be a balance of probabilities.233 
 
3.2.3 Scope of application 
In the Netherlands, an administrative penalty for an airline’s failure to surrender the required 
emission licence234 may be levied in addition to an increase in the GHG allowances that airline 
must annually surrender.235 If an emissions trading licence is violated, an administrative order 
under penalty236 may be imposed as well as an administrative penalty.237 
 
In the UK, the EA may not serve a notice of intent to impose a FMP where a VMP (or 
other discretionary requirement) has been imposed on that person for that act or omission.  A 
notice of intent to serve a VMP cannot be served where a FMP has already been imposed, or 
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the person has discharged FMP liability by paying the prescribed sum.238 A VMP may not be 
imposed on a person on more than one occasion in relation to the same act or omission.239 
Provision to pay a FMP, VMP or non-compliance penalty may include provision for: early 
payment discounts; payment of interest or other late payment penalties (which cannot exceed 
the penalty amount); and penalty enforcement.240 
 
Apart from criminal penalties,241 a possible lesson to be drawn from these two 
jurisdictions is that an administrative penalty should be in addition to any other environmental 
penalty, and should only be imposed once per violation. 
 
3.2.4 Institutional arrangements 
In the Netherlands, NEA is an agency affiliated with the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment.242 It is an autonomous government organisation with independent sanctioning 
and enforcement powers,243 responsible for allocating emission rights, issuing emission 
permits, monitoring compliance and imposing sanctions.244 
 
The EA in the UK is an executive non-departmental body accountable to the 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and aims to protect the 
environment and contribute to sustainable development by implementing UK government 
policies. 245 The EA must have regard to published guidance when exercising its functions.246 
This includes: the circumstances in which the penalty is likely to be imposed and when it may 
not be levied; rights to make representations and objections and appeal rights.247 FMP 
Guidance includes: the penalty amount; how to discharge liability; and the effect of 
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discharge.248 VMP guidance also contains the factors EA considers in determining the 
penalty.249  
 
Enforcement guidance includes: possible sanctions; action EA may take to enforce 
the offence; and when EA is likely to take action.250 In deciding on the appropriate response to 
environmental non-compliance, EA must consider: the outcomes sought; immediate action for 
environmental protection; and whether additional action is required. If advice has not resulted 
in the desired result, these public interest factors will be considered to determine the 
appropriate sanction: intent; foreseeability; environmental effect; nature of offence; financial 
implications; deterrent effect; and the offender’s history, attitude, and personal 
circumstances.251 
 
As is the case in these two jurisdictions, it is preferable for officials with specialist 
expertise to administer and impose administrative penalties. These officials should be 
adequately trained to understand when administrative penalties are appropriate, and to 
exercise appropriate discretion in the evaluation of VMP factors.252  
 
Transparency, fairness, consistency and accountability are crucial for effective 
administrative penalties.253  There should be publicly-available guidance which contains 
similar information to the UK Guidance. Ideally, the enforcement policy should be drafted in 
consultation with the regulated community and wider stakeholder groups.254 The public and 
regulated entities must know what action regulators will take when a violation is discovered.255 
The policy must state the circumstances in which different types of enforcement action will be 
imposed, and how fines will be calculated (including the factors considered in determining the 
fine).256 It should also contain information like: relevant time limits; the scale of charges; 
                                                     
248  S.63(3)(c),(d) RES Act; s.11(2)(c),(d) ECSO. 
249  S.63(4)(c) RES Act; s.11(3)(c) ECSO. 
250  S.64(2) RES Act. 
251  Guidance 13-16. 
252  Fn.67. 
253  Fn.136. 
254  Macrory Report 97. 
255  OECD Fines 25. 
256  Macrory Consultation 8,21-22,55,59; OECD Fines 25-26; Macrory Report 10,32-33,35,86-99; OECD Fines 





methods of payment; and complaints and appeals mechanisms.257 Enforcement policies 
should retain some flexibility. To boost confidence in the system, regulators must be able to 
justify the enforcement action chosen, and any departures from the policy.258 Enforcement 
policies should be periodically reviewed and improved.259 
 
3.2.5 Decision-making process 
The Dutch GALA provides that NEA and the competent supervisor may draw up a report of 
the violation (including the legislative violation; and, if necessary, the violation date, time and 
place), to present to the violator by the date of fine notification. If a Code of Criminal 
Procedure260 investigating officer’s report has been prepared, the administrative report is not 
required.261 Where an administrative penalty of more than €340.00 may be imposed, one of 
these reports is mandatory, as is the violator’s opportunity to make submissions.262 In such 
event, the report-drafter may not impose the fine.263 For non-discretionary fine offences, the 
report includes the intention to add the offender’s name to the published list of transgressors, 
and the offender may also make submissions on this.264 The violator may inspect and copy 
the information on which the fine is based, which, if reasonably required for the offender’s 
defence, should be their language.265  
 
For those violations which require NEA to exercise discretion regarding fine 
imposition, the legislation gives no guidance. If a report has been drawn up of a violation, NEA 
decides – within 13 weeks – whether to impose the fine. If the violation is submitted to the 
prosecutor, this time limit is suspended until NEA regains power to impose an administrative 
penalty. 266 If, after the violator has expressed their views, NEA decides: not to impose a fine; 
or to submit the violation for prosecution, it advises the violator in writing.267  
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For discretionary fine offences, the violator may only receive the administrative report 
with the fine decision. This decision must be based on sound reasons, and, in general, all 
decisions must contain these reasons and the relevant legislative provisions.268 The decision 
should also contain the fine amount,269 and the deadline for payment270 (usually six weeks).271 
For EMA non-discretionary fines, the decision also states that the offender’s name will be 
published,272 and NEA adds the name to the transgressors’ list.273 
 
In the UK, where the EA proposes to impose a FMP, it must serve a notice of intent 
which includes: the grounds; the penalty amount; that liability can be discharged by paying 50 
per cent within 28 days; the right to make representations and objections (within 28 days); and 
the circumstances in which it may not impose the FMP (including any defences).274 If the EA 
possesses material undermining its case, it must disclose this.275 A person who made 
representations timeously may discharge liability as per this notice.276 
 
Before serving a VMP notice, EA may require the provision of reasonable information 
to establish the offence’s financial benefit.277 VMPs have three components: financial benefit 
(to remove the offence’s benefit); deterrent; and deduction (to reduce the penalty by the costs 
the violator incurred - like complying with a compliance notice). The deterrent component is 
based on: the financial benefit; the costs to comply with a restoration notice; or the maximum 
criminal fine a magistrate’s court could impose for the offence where there is neither 
significant benefit or restoration; and then adjusted according to aggravating and mitigating 
factors. Aggravating factors include: blameworthiness, non-compliance history, foreseeability 
and risk of environmental harm, and ignoring previous advice. Mitigating factors include: 
preventative measures, cooperation with EA, self-reporting, immediate voluntary remediation 
and restoration, and personal circumstances. The offender’s attitude could either aggravate or 
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mitigate.278 Persons who cannot pay the full penalty amount may provide submissions and 
evidence for EA’s consideration.279 
 
The deterrent and financial benefit components are added together to: challenge the 
offender’s behaviour; deter others; and assure others that offenders have not secured any 
advantage. From this amount, the costs incurred by the violator are deducted.280 Regulators 
must exercise their reasonable judgement on the appropriate penalty on the basis of the 
available evidence.281The VMP amount determined is included in the notice of intent. The 
procedure for imposing a VMP is similar to the FMP process. The offender can undertake to 
take action (including a monetary payment) to benefit anyone affected by the offence: EA can 
accept or reject an undertaking, and consider any accepted undertaking in its decision.282 
 
As soon as possible after the representations period, the EA decides whether to 
impose the sanction (with or without modification) or to impose a different sanction.283 
Decisions to proceed with a civil sanction, notwithstanding contrary representations, will be 
made by a separate reviewing lawyer and manager.284 Where EA decides to impose the FMP, 
the notice imposing it (the final notice) includes: the penalty amount; the imposition grounds; 
payment methods; the period of 56 days for payment; any early payment discounts or late 
payment penalties; appeal rights; and non-payment consequences.285 Following VMP 
representations, the final amount is included in the final notice.286 
 
Having considered the procedure in these two jurisdictions, it is proposed that, in an 
administrative penalty system, an offender should receive notification of the intention to 
impose a monetary penalty, including relevant details of the violation (and other information 
similar to the UK procedure), and should have a reasonable opportunity to make submissions 
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regarding the factors used to calculate the fine.287 The decision-maker must carefully consider 
the representations – and, for a VMP, also the relevant mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances – to decide whether to impose a fine. In making this decision, the regulator 
must be guided by its policies.288 Generally, more junior staff could impose FMPs, but 
decisions regarding VMPs should be taken by more senior officials, independently from 
inspectors, to protect the relationship between field staff and industry and for a more 
consistent regulatory approach.289 When the offender is notified of the fine imposition, reasons 
should be provided, and the offender advised of details like: the payment deadline; 
consequences of non-payment; and the appeal right (and how and where to lodge an appeal). 
 
3.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta 
In the Netherlands, maximum administrative penalties are generally determined by statute and 
the administrative authority imposes a lower fine if the violator demonstrates special 
circumstances. If the amount is not legislatively determined, the authority sets the fine at an 
amount commensurate with the violation’s gravity and the offender’s blameworthiness. If 
necessary, the authority considers the circumstances of the violation.290   
 
The maximum administrative penalty for discretionary fine offences is €450,000 per 
violation; or, if the turnover in the preceding financial year exceeded €4.5 million, ten per cent 
of the undertaking’s turnover.291 In relation to non-discretionary fine offences, the fine is 
prescribed in the Directive292 for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent by which the annual 
emissions exceed the GHG emission allowances, emission reduction units or certified 
emission reductions surrendered.293 A lower penalty may not be imposed.294 The Directive 
requires that member states ensure that operators who do not annually surrender sufficient 
allowances to cover emissions during the preceding year are liable for an excess emissions 
penalty of €100 for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted by that installation for 
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which the operator has not surrendered allowances. Payment of this penalty does not release 
the operator from the obligation to surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess 
emissions when surrendering allowances in relation to the following calendar year.295 This 
amount is increased annually in accordance with the European consumer price index.296 
 
In the UK, where the relevant offence is: for a FMP, triable summarily (whether or not 
it is also triable on indictment), and for a VMP, triable summarily only; and, for both, 
punishable on summary conviction by a fine (whether or not it is also punishable by 
imprisonment), the penalty amount may not exceed the maximum fine amount.297 The 
maximum FMP is £100 for an individual or £300 for a body corporate.298 The amount of a 
VMP must not exceed £250,000.299 Where the VMP would be greater than £250,000, the EA 
usually prosecutes.300 
 
As in the UK and for EMA non-discretionary fine violations, it is recommended that 
FMP amounts be determined by statute.301 Since administrative penalties are for less 
egregious violations that do not warrant criminal prosecution,302 maximum VMPs should not 
exceed the maximum criminal fine that could be imposed. If the fine would exceed this 
amount, it is recommended that, as in the UK, the regulator prosecute. 
 
3.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds 
Because Dutch administrative penalties are paid to the authority that imposed the sanction, 
unless otherwise provided by law,303  EMA fines are paid to NEA. 
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However, in the UK, where a regulator receives any monetary penalty or interest for 
late payment, it must be paid into the Consolidated Fund (the government’s general bank 
account), and is not available to regulators.304  
 
Best practice requires that, to prevent any incentive for regulators to increase their 
revenues improperly by levying inappropriate fines, funds from administrative penalties should 
not be available – directly or indirectly – to the regulator that imposed the fine.305 This is 
contrary to the Dutch position, but the same as in the UK.  
 
3.2.8 Appeal and review procedures 
In the Netherlands, GALA provides that, if a decision is open to objection (reconsideration by 
the administrative authority) or administrative appeal (review by a different administrative 
authority),306 this is stated in the decision, together with details as to time limits (generally six 
weeks),307 and where the objection or appeal may be lodged308 (objection notices are filed 
with NEA; administrative appeal notices are filed with appellate authorities; and administrative 
court appeals are instituted by filing appeal notices with that court).309 Notices describe the 
challenged decision and the grounds, and, if possible, include the decision.310 Generally, an 
objection precedes an administrative court appeal.311 In appropriate circumstances, NEA 
grants an applicant’s request to appeal directly to the administrative court.312 An objection or 
appeal does not suspend the challenged decision’s operation, unless otherwise provided by 
law.313 
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Before deciding an objection or administrative appeal, NEA gives interested parties 
the opportunity to be heard.314 At least a week before the hearing, NEA makes all relevant 
documents available for inspection by interested parties - who may also file additional 
documents until ten days before the hearing.315  Parties are generally heard in each other's 
presence.316 Witnesses and experts may be heard.317  
 
Unless the objection hearing is handled wholly or partly by NEA, it is conducted by: 
someone not involved in preparing the challenged decision, or two or more persons of whom 
the majority (including the chairman) were not so involved. Unless otherwise provided by law, 
NEA determines whether the hearing will be public.318  An advisory committee – consisting of 
a chairman (neither a member of nor working under NEA’s authority) and at least two 
members – may decide an objection. NEA may explain its position at the hearing.319 The 
appellate authority or an advisory committee conducts an administrative appeal. The hearing 
is public, unless, for compelling reasons, the authority decides otherwise, or an interested 
party so requests.320 A record of the hearing is kept.321 If, after the hearing, the relevant 
authority becomes aware of facts with considerable relevance to the decision, this is 
communicated to interested parties - who have the opportunity to be heard.322 
 
The authority deciding an objection generally gives its decision within six weeks from 
the day after the deadline for filing an objection notice, or within 12 weeks if there is an 
advisory committee.323 The administrative appeal time period is the same if the appellate 
authority is part of the body whose decision is being appealed. Otherwise, the authority 
generally decides within 16 weeks from the day after the appeal’s expiry date.324 An advisory 
committee’s recommendation is written and includes the hearing record. If the decision 
departs from the recommendation, this must be explained and the recommendation 
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enclosed.325 Sound reasons for the decision must be provided and reasons stated if no 
hearing is held. The decision is sent to its addressees and communicated to interested parties 
as soon as possible. The appeal decision must also be communicated to the authority whose 
decision was appealed.326  
 
If the objection is admissible, the challenged decision is reconsidered. If the 
reconsideration gives cause to do so, the administrative authority revokes the decision and, if 
necessary, replaces it.327 The objection decision may be appealed.328 If the appellate authority 
finds the appeal well-founded, it annuls and may replace the challenged decision.329 If the 
decision on the objection or appeal is appealable, this is stated when the decision is notified, 
as well as who may lodge an appeal, where and by when.330  
 
Appeals of EMA administrative penalties are decided by The Hague District Court.331 
Cases are first considered by a single-judge panel, but, if deemed unsuitable for a one-judge 
panel, are referred to a three-judge panel (which may also refer a case to a single judge).332 
Generally, natural persons without legal capacity to appear in judicial proceedings are 
represented as per civil law rules.333 As far as possible, the court must decide the matter 
finally.334 
 
A preliminary inquiry takes place. Within four weeks of the administrative authority’s 
receipt of an appeal notice, it sends the case-related documents to court and files a 
defence.335 If the court affords the appellant the opportunity to reply, the authority may submit 
a rejoinder. Other parties may make written submissions.336 The court may permit the 
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authority to correct a defect in the challenged decision;337 and, if so, parties have four weeks 
for written submissions.338 The judge advises parties of the further conduct of the matter within 
four weeks of: the authority indicating it will not repair the defect; the deadline for the defect to 
be repaired; the representations; or the representations deadline.339 Until the parties are 
invited to appear in court, the district court may, in certain circumstances, close the inquiry, 
and give judgment directing the authority to deal with the appeal notice as an objection 
notice.340 This judgment may be opposed.341 
 
Parties must cooperate in an investigation,342 but appellants are not obliged to testify 
about the violation.343 Those summoned must appear, provide requested information,344 and 
testify when required.345 If persons fail to comply with these obligations, the district court may 
draw appropriate conclusions.346  
 
After the preliminary enquiry is closed, parties receive at least three weeks’ notice to 
appear in court,347 and may file additional documents until ten days before the hearing.348 
Generally, the hearing is public.349  With the parties' consent, the district court may direct that 
there will be no hearing - the inquiry is then closed.350 The court closes the hearing following 
examination of the case and the parties’ final speeches. Thereafter, the judge: gives oral 
judgement immediately;351 or announces when judgment will be given352 (usually oral 
judgment can only be deferred by a week and written judgment is given within six weeks).353  
Judgment comprises the decision, its grounds, and states who is entitled to which remedy - 
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before which court and by when.354 If the district court annuls the penalty decision, it decides 
the fine imposition and directs the extent to which its judgment replaces the annulled 
decision.355 Where a judgment includes an award of damages, costs or compensation, it is 
enforceable in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure.356 The judgment may declare that: the 
district court lacks jurisdiction; the appeal is inadmissible, unfounded or well-founded.357 If the 
appeal is well-founded, the judgment sets out the violation.358 The court also annuls all of part 
of the decision, and may order the authority to take a new decision, perform another act, or 
replace the annulled decision. A non-compliance penalty may also be ordered.359 
 
A district court may reopen an inquiry it considers not to have been complete, and 
determine its further conduct.360 GALA makes provision for interim judgments,361 and 
provisional relief.362  A court may review a final judgment on the grounds of facts: which 
occurred before judgment; of which the applicant was not and could not reasonably have been 
aware prior to judgment; and which might have resulted in a different judgment had the court 
been aware of them.363  
 
There is a higher appeal available to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the 
Council of State.364 Generally, this appeal would not suspend the appeal decision’s 
operation.365 The court clerk of the higher appellate court advises the district court clerk of the 
appeal as soon as possible. The latter provides the former with the court record and judgment 
within one week, and a report of the hearing (if requested).366 There is provision for a cross-
appeal within six weeks of receipt of the grounds of higher appeal. Interested parties may 
make written submissions within four weeks of these grounds. Generally, inadmissibility or 
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withdrawal of the higher appeal does not affect the cross-appeal’s admissibility.367 The higher 
appellate court can: confirm the district court’s decision (adopting or improving it); or partially 
or completely replace it. If the judgment requires that the authority take a new decision, it may 
provide that only the higher appellate court can hear an appeal of such decision.368 In certain 
circumstances, the higher appellate court may refer the case back to the district court.369 
 
In the UK, the person on whom a FMP is imposed may appeal.370 Appeal grounds 
include that the decision was: unreasonable; based on an error of fact; or wrong in law.371 
VMP appeal grounds are the same, with an additional ground that the penalty amount is 
unreasonable.372 Appeals are to a first-tier Tribunal (Tribunal) established in terms of the 
Tribunals Act,373 consisting of judges and other members.374 Tribunal Rules375 govern this 
process376 and the Tribunal may give directions on issues like: document inspections; 
statements; and the evidence required.377 Parties may be represented.378 An appellant lodges 
an appeal notice within 28 days of the decision, including: the appeal grounds; the relief 
sought; a written record of the decision challenged; and any statement of reasons. The 
Tribunal sends these documents to respondents,379 who respond within 28 days, including any 
opposition grounds, and the written record and decision reasons (if these were not in the 
notice).380 Within 14 days, appellants may make written submissions, with supporting 
documents, in reply.381  
 
Appeals are considered at a hearing (unless agreed otherwise and the Tribunal is 
satisfied that a hearing is not required),382 of which at least 14 days’ notice is provided.383 
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Usually, hearings are public384 and each party may: attend any hearing; and send written 
representations to the Tribunal and other parties before the hearing.385 In certain 
circumstances, the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in a party’s absence.386 EA must 
prove the commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In other cases, the Tribunal 
determines the standard of proof. Notices387 are suspended pending appeal. The Tribunal 
may: withdraw, confirm or vary the sanction; take such steps as EA could take; or remit the 
decision whether to confirm the decision (or any related matter) to EA.388 The Tribunal may 
give a decision orally at a hearing. As soon as practicable, it provides to each party: a decision 
notice and written reasons; and notification of any appeal right (and how to exercise it).389  
 
A party seeking permission to appeal the Tribunal’s decision makes written 
application to the Tribunal within 28 days of the latest of: receipt of written reasons; notification 
of amended reasons or the decision’s correction following a review; or notification of failure of 
an application to set it aside. The application sets out the alleged error of law and the result 
sought.390 The Tribunal must first decide whether to review the decision. If it does not do so 
(or takes no action following a review), it considers whether to grant appeal permission. A 
record of its decision must be sent to the parties as soon as practicable.  If permission is 
refused, the record must be accompanied by: reasons for such refusal; and notification of the 
right and procedure to make an application to the Upper Tribunal (UT) (which consists of 
judges and other members)391 for permission to appeal.392 The Tribunal may also review a 
decision containing an error of law. Generally, all parties may make review representations. 
The Tribunal must notify the parties in writing of the review outcome, and of any appeal 
right.393 
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The Tribunals Act provides that, with Tribunal or UT permission, a Tribunal decision 
may be appealed to UT on a legal point.394 If UT sets aside the Tribunal’s decision, it must 
either remit the case to the Tribunal with reconsideration directions, or re-make the decision, 
by making any decision the Tribunal could make and appropriate factual findings.395 There is 
also an appeal right to the relevant appellate court on any point of law arising from UT’s 
decision. Permission may be sought from UT (or the appellate court if UT refuses). The 
appellate court has the same decision-making powers as the UT.396 Both the Tribunal and UT 
may review their own decisions.397 
 
EA publishes reports specifying the cases in which: civil sanctions have been 
imposed;398 FMP liability discharged; third party undertakings accepted; and enforcement 
undertakings concluded.399 To ensure that sanctioning is in line with good practice and applied 
consistently, EA has centrally-coordinated arrangements to review or monitor individual 
decisions,400 and civil sanctions are monitored and overseen by a director-led national 
panel.401 Having consulted appropriate persons, the relevant Minister reviews the operation of 
provisions conferring power on regulators to impose civil sanctions, particularly considering 
whether the provision has implemented its objectives efficiently and effectively. The review 
results are published and provided to Parliament.402 
 
It is recommended that – as is the UK - appeal grounds be contained in legislation.403 
The appeal tribunal should be staffed by adjudicators with environmental expertise – ideally, a 
legal expert, an expert in the particular area, and a member from a relevant stakeholder 
group.404  A notice of appeal, setting out the appeal grounds, should be filed with the appeal 
tribunal. Generally, an appeal should suspend the decision’s operation. At the appeal tribunal, 
                                                     
394  S.11. The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 govern the UT Procedure. 
395  S.12. 
396  Ss.13-14. 
397  Ss.9-10. 
398  S.65(2)(a),s.65(3). 
399  S.65(2)-(3),s.14(1)-(2). 
400  DEFRA Review 23. 
401  www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/regulation/116844.aspx. 
402  S.67. 
403  Macrory Report 55-56. 





the appeal can be a full re-hearing on the merits, or deal only with a particular issue.405 As in 
the UK, appeals should usually be public.  
 
In a FMP appeal, the first step could be an internal review by the regulator to allow the 
presentation of information that it may not have been aware of before imposing the penalty. 
Thereafter, the regulator can: uphold its decision; reverse its decision; or impose a lesser 
sanction. If the appellant remains dissatisfied, an appeal can be brought before the appeal 
tribunal. Parties can agree that the FMP appeal be determined on the papers only.406 A VMP 
appeal should take the form of an oral hearing.407 The appeal tribunal must provide reasons 
for its decision, and can confirm, set aside, and where appropriate, replace the regulator’s 
decision. Costs can also be awarded. The appeal decision should also indicate that it can be 
taken on review or appeal to a higher appellate tribunal, as well as the time period for doing 
so. 
 
An appeal notice containing the appeal grounds should be delivered to the higher 
appeal tribunal, which, as in the UK, has the same powers as the appeal tribunal. Again, the 
appeal could be a full re-hearing or limited to a particular disputed aspect regarding the 
administrative penalty. A record should be kept of all proceedings and both tribunals should 
have the status of a High Court so that their orders are executable.408 
 
There must be good record-keeping on the use of administrative penalties.409  
Enforcement bodies should measure the environmental advantages of enforcement action, 
such as steps taken by industry in response.410 Regulators must follow up enforcement 
actions to ensure compliance, and subsequent follow-ups should determine the effect of the 
action on compliance.411  
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For administrative penalties to be effective deterrents, environmental agencies should 
regularly publicise the outcomes of enforcement action – including administrative penalties – 
and not only the number of actions taken. If outcomes are monitored, officials, the public and 
the regulated community will know the impact of enforcement action, and whether it must be 
changed to improve these results.412 Officials should make public: the number of fines 
imposed; their monetary value; the violators; the nature of the violations; whether fines have 
been paid; and if not, what enforcement will be (or has been) taken.413 A strong message must 
be sent to other potential offenders that any non-compliance will be penalised with meaningful 
fines.414   
 
3.2.9 Effect of penalty on criminal offence 
The Dutch GALA provides that an administrative authority shall not impose an administrative 
penalty if criminal proceedings have been brought against the violator for the same act, and 
the hearing has started or a penalty imposed.415 If the conduct is also a criminal offence and 
the seriousness of the offence or the circumstances under which it was committed warrant 
this, NEA presents it for prosecution,416 together with the administrative report.417 If an act is 
one that must be submitted to the prosecutor, NEA may only impose an administrative penalty 
if the prosecutor has: informed NEA that there will be no prosecution, or failed to respond 
within 13 weeks.418 An administrative penalty imposed for conduct which is also a criminal 
offence is void if the Court419 orders that the offender be prosecuted.420 
 
In the UK, where a notice of intent to impose a FMP is served: no criminal 
proceedings for the relevant offence may be instituted for 28 days; and if that person 
discharges liability or an FMP is imposed, they may not be convicted of the offence.421 If a 
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VMP is imposed or a third party undertaking is accepted, that person may generally not be 
convicted. However, conviction is possible if: a non-monetary discretionary requirement is 
imposed, or an undertaking422 is accepted; no VMP is imposed; or there is non-compliance 
with this requirement or undertaking. Criminal proceedings for such offences triable summarily 
may be instituted up to six months from the date EA notifies the person of their failure to 
comply.423 
 
To commence a prosecution, EA must be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect of 
conviction, as required by the Code for Crown Prosecutors.424 Where, for instance: the offence 
has caused (or may cause) serious harm to the environment or people; there is overt 
criminality, gross negligence or reckless behaviour; or non-compliance has been protracted 
and serious, EA would generally prosecute, having regard to the public interest 
considerations.425 
 
A possible lesson to be drawn from these jurisdictions is that, if liability for a monetary 
penalty has been discharged, or a FMP or VMP has been imposed, no criminal proceedings 
should be instituted for the violation, as criminal and administrative penalties are alternatives 
to one another. If the conduct is particularly egregious,426 or also amounts to a criminal 
offence and there is a realistic prospect of conviction, the authority should present it for 
prosecution. Also, an administrative penalty cannot be imposed if criminal proceedings have 
been instituted or a criminal penalty imposed for the violation. For the reasons explained in 
Chapter 4, s24G is different – and both the ‘administrative fine’ and criminal liability apply. 
  
3.2.10 Non-compliance implications 
In the Netherlands, GALA provides that a debtor who fails to pay the fine within the prescribed 
period is in default and liable to statutory interest.427 NEA may recover the sum by compulsory 
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payment order.428  This is an enforceable order, served and executed at the debtor’s 
expense,429 which enables the creditor to proceed to execution in terms of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.430 The demand notice fee, statutory interest and cost of an enforcement order may 
also be collected.431 A right of action for payment of money prescribes five years after the 
payment period expires.432 If an administrative penalty is imposed on one person twice within 
four years for the same violation, NEA can withdraw the authorisation for a facility with GHG 
installations.433 
 
In the UK, provision to pay a penalty may include: provision for EA to recover it, and 
any interest or other financial penalty for late payment, as a civil debt; provision for these 
amounts to be recoverable, on the order of a county court or the High Court, as if payable 
under a court order.434 The penalty must be paid within 56 days of the final notice; and, 
following an unsuccessful appeal, a penalty must be paid within 28 days. Failure to pay 
increases the penalty by 50 per cent.435 Where a FMP or VMP is not paid, the defaulter cannot 
be prosecuted for the original offence – unpaid penalties are enforced in civil courts.436 The 
application can be decided by a court officer without a hearing. Once the order is made, EA 
may proceed to enforcement action – including a warrant of execution to seize money or 
goods to the amount’s value; a charging order on the debtor’s property; and a third party debt 
order (usually to prevent the debtor from withdrawing money from their bank account).437 
 
It is recommended that interest be levied on an unpaid administrative penalty. 
Decision of the relevant authorities and tribunals should be enforceable as if they were court 
orders.438 
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Chapter 4 assesses s24G against the lessons identified in this chapter, and makes 
practical suggestions for an environmental law administrative penalty system in SA. 
 
4 CHAPTER 4: ADMINISTRATIVE PENALITES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REGIME 
 
SA environmental law does not contain a true administrative penalty. The criminal sanction’s 
deficiencies, the many advantages of administrative penalties,439 and the success of 
administrative penalties in other jurisdictions,440 mean that an administrative penalty system 
holds enormous potential for SA’s EC&E. This chapter critically evaluates the s24G 
‘administrative fine’, and the amendments made to it on 18 December 2013 by the National 
Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act 30 of 2013 (Amendment Act).441 
This evaluation is informed by the lessons drawn from the assessment of the administrative 
penalty schemes in operation in the Netherlands and the UK, undertaken in Chapter 3. 
Accordingly, it is similary structured; with the first part providing a brief overview of the relevant 
regime, and the second part, a critical evaluation based on the themes used in Chapter 3. 
 
4.1 Overview of s24G  
NEMA contains National Environmental Management (NEM) principles to guide the 
implementation of environmental legislation.442 The precautionary principle requires a risk-
averse approach,443 and the preventive principle is that negative impacts on the environment 
and environmental rights must be prevented; alternatively, minimised and remedied.444 
Polluters must pay to remedy, and to prevent or minimise pollution and consequent health 
effects.445 
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Integrated environmental management (IEM) is central to NEMA, and includes 
evaluating activities’ impacts on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural 
heritage, and alternative options to mitigate these.446  IEM dictates that environmental 
authorisations are required for certain activities.447 Detailed requirements (including, in some 
cases, environmental impact assessments (EIAs)) must be followed before authorisation is 
obtained. Activities’ potential environmental consequences, and the option of not 
implementing the activity, must be assessed and reported on.448 The state organ that decides 
whether to grant authorisation (the competent authority (CA))449 also considers feasible and 
reasonable alternatives to and modifications of the activity to minimise environmental harm.450 
All parties interested in and affected by the proposed activity (IAPs) require a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in public procedures regarding its potential environmental 
consequences.451 
 
Section 24F (s24F), read with section 49A(1)(a) of NEMA, makes it an offence to 
commence an activity listed or specified in the EIA Listing Notices, 2010 (LN) without prior 
authorisation.452 However, s24G permits ex post facto authorisation of activities that 
commenced unlawfully.453 S24G provides that anyone who has commenced a listed activity 
without authorisation can apply to the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, the 
provincial MEC for environmental affairs, or their delegate for a directive. Prior to its 
amendment, s24G provided that this directive was to compile and submit a report containing: 
an assessment of the nature, extent, duration and significance of the activity’s environmental 
impacts (including cumulative effects); mitigation measures undertaken or to be undertaken; 
the public participation process followed (which also addressed all IAP comments); an 
environmental management programme; and any other information required. As set out 
below, the amended s24G makes provision for various other directives. The CA determines an 
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administrative fine – a maximum of R5 million – for the applicant.454 After payment of the fine, 
the Minister or MEC considers the documents provided, and may then: refuse to issue 
authorisation; issue authorisation subject to conditions; or direct the provision of further 
information or additional steps before deciding whether to grant authorisation.455 Failure to 
comply with a directive or a condition is an offence, punishable by a maximum fine of R10 
million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.456  
 
When s24G was promulgated, the maximum R1 million fine was one of the highest 
fines for environmental legislation, and caused some concern among potential violators.457 
However, s24G has been controversial and frustrating, and its effective application severely 
hampered by interpretation difficulties.458 Effectively, a person contemplating the undertaking 
of a listed activity can choose either: to follow the prescribed route of seeking authorisation 
before commencing the activity; or, if the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs, or 
there is some doubt as to whether authorisation will be granted, to undertake the activity and 
seek s24G authorisation.459 
 
Although s24G was not intended as an invitation to commit offences for later 
correction,460 this is what appears to have happened. The widespread abuse of s24G has 
become the most prevalent environmental offence.461 The DEA has noted that: ‘many people 
tend to knowingly commence with a listed activity without [authorisation] and later apply for a 
[s24G authorisation] to rectify the unlawful commencement’, and that this poses ‘serious 
dangers to the credibility of the [EIA] process’.462 This has been confirmed by research in 
Gauteng, which revealed that the section ‘has seriously undermined the overall compliance 
and enforcement effort by opening the door to abuse and providing a mechanism which 
effectively accommodates environmental crime’.463 Many violators simply budget for the 
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administrative fine and proceed without authorisation, knowing they can apply for [s24G] 
‘rectification’ if they are discovered.464 
 
When a s24G application is made, the violator often presents the CA with a fait 
accompli, at a stage where it is too late to consider alternatives - damage to the environment 
has been done, and might even be irreversible. In other words, the CA has little basis to 
refuse the application,465 and it is unlikely that an authority or a court would order the 
demolition of an illegal structure.466 This approach renders environmental assessment 
ineffective.467 This is exacerbated because the vast majority – if not all - s24G applications 
succeed.468 
 
 The Amendment Act attempts to address some of s24G’s significant problems. 
However, as explained below, it fails to deal with all of the problems with the section.  
 
4.2 Critical evaluation of s24G 
S24G triggers some broad constitutional issues, and arguably amounts to an unreasonable, 
unjustifiable violation of the constitutional right.469 The idea that a lawful activity can follow 
from unlawful administrative action is contrary to the constitutional rule of law,470 read with the 
principle of administrative legality and administrative justice.471 Retrospective authorisation is 
inconsistent with NEMA’s purpose to promote environmental rights472 and with the preventive 
and precautionary principles; falls foul of the principles that promote IAPs’ participation in 
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environmental decision-making;473 and is incompatible with IEM - principles required by 
sustainable development474 - and international law obligations. Conducting an EIA and 
obtaining prior authorisation for an activity, are integral to the environmental right,475 and there 
are sufficient legislative tools to regularise unlawful activities without s24G.476  
 
However, as the section has not been subject to constitutional scrutiny, the analysis 
will focus on the lessons to be learned from foreign experience, with a view to improving the 
current formulation of s24G (although the preference is for s24G to be scrapped entirely), and 
introducing a true administrative penalty system into SA environmental law  
  
4.2.1 Nature of penalty 
Although it is referred to as an ‘administrative fine’, the s24G fine is not strictly punitive – 
payment merely triggers the consideration of the application for ex post facto approval of an 
activity.477 The Minister or MEC may direct the provision of a report and may require additional 
information.478 Prior to its amendment, s24G provided that, after the CA determined an 
administrative fine, the Minister or MEC considered the reports and information submitted and 
decided whether to: direct the person to cease the activity and rehabilitate the environment; or 
issue an authorisation. The Amendment Act479 makes explicit provision for the refusal of the 
authorisation480 and for the provision of further information.481 The fact that the fine is 
determined before the authority evaluates the information482 militates against it being an 
administrative penalty of the nature described in Chapter 2.  
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 True administrative penalties are hybrid in nature.483 They are more proportionate to 
the type of offence and harm caused, and easier to administer and impose than criminal 
penalties.484 It is recommended that a conventional administrative penalty system be 
introduced into SA, with FMPs for minor infringements and VMPs for more serious offences or 
where there is evidence of mismanagement or negligence.485 The s24G administrative fine 
triggers the consideration of an application for ex post facto environmental authorisation in the 
circumstances set out in 4.2.2 below – there is no distinction between FMPs and VMPs as in 
the UK.  
 
4.2.2 Trigger for penalty 
Prior to its amendment, s24G(1) provided that ‘a person who has committed an offence in 
terms of s24F(2)(a)’ – i.e. commenced a so-called listed486 or specified487 activity without 
authorisation - could apply for ‘rectification’ in terms of s24G. Although it was held in 
Supersize Investments 11 CC v MEC of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism, 
Limpopo Provincial Government and another488 that s24G(1) meant that there had to be 
criminal proceedings against an applicant, this cannot be correct.  S24G applied to anyone 
who had commenced an activity identified in terms of section 24(2)(a) or (b) (which amounted 
to an offence). It did not indicate that it applied to a person who had been ‘charged and/or 
convicted of an offence’. The Amendment Act contains the following improved formulation: ‘on 
application by a person who has commenced with a listed or specified activity without 
[authorisation] in contravention of s24F(1)’.489 However, this should read ‘s24F(1)(a)’ because 
s24F(1)(b) refers to activities that do not require authorisation, but instead must comply with 
prescribed norms or standards. Alternatively, if the intention is for s24G also to be applicable 
to activities that do not comply with prescribed norms and standards, a distinction should be 
made between s24F(1)(a) and (b) offences.490 
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In practice, there is a trend for companies to rely on the emergency defence to 
criminal liability,491 and then to make a s24G application. As the section does not provide for 
separate responses to different fault levels, intentional and repeat offenders are let off too 
easily, while ‘innocent’ offenders are prejudiced by s24G’s criminal stigma in the context of 
section 49A(1)(a)’s strict liability.492   
 
 It was incorrectly held in Supersize that the intention of the legislature was not to force 
innocent applicants to admit to a crime, in order to fall within the ambit of s24G. In other 
words, that those who bona fide commence an activity without authorisation fall outside the 
purview of s24G, and can apply for authorisation, with completion of the construction regarded 
as the ‘proposed activity’.493 As set out above, fault is not a requirement of s24F or s24G, and 
the violator’s state of mind is therefore irrelevant.  
 
If s24G remains in SA law, payment of the administrative fine should be limited to 
negligent violations. The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) has proposed that anyone 
who falls within s24F’s ambit is required immediately to cease the activity and take reasonable 
measures to mitigate environmental degradation from the offence. Secondly, it proposed that 
a s24G applicant would have to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence was not 
committed intentionally. If this onus cannot be discharged, such person would have to 
rehabilitate all environmental degradation - to the satisfaction of the CA - and would not be 
permitted to apply for s24G authorisation. An applicant who can show that the offence was not 
intentional, but cannot show that it was not committed negligently, can apply for s24G 
authorisation. An ‘innocent’ violator – who can show that the offence was not committed with 
intent or negligence – can apply for s24G authorisation, but should not be required to pay the 
administrative fine.494  None of these suggestions – which would prevent the cynical use of 
s24G to avoid conducting an environmental assessment - was taken on board in the 
Amendment Act.  
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Insofar as the introduction of a true administrative penalty is concerned, and bearing 
in mind the lessons from the Netherlands and the UK, the trigger for an administrative fine 
should be the commission of certain violations of environmental legislation495 which are not 
sufficiently egregious to warrant criminal prosecution.496 Generally, intentional offenders 
should instead be prosecuted, as should those who are repeat offenders and/or who have 
committed infringements causing serious damage to people or the environment.497 It is 
recommended that strict liability offences generally be reserved for FMPs,498 with VMPs for 
negligent violations. VMPs may also be available for ‘innocent’ breaches if these have serious 
consequences, or the offence resulted in significant financial gain.499 
 
Contrary to the UK’s position, and because a violator does not face criminal position, 
the standard of proof for administrative penalties and appeals should be a balance of 
probabilities.500 This is the same standard required by the Competition Act.501  
  
4.2.3 Scope of application 
Until its amendment, s24G only applied to activities identified in EIA LNs as requiring 
authorisation.502 The LNs specifically include activities that require an atmospheric emission 
licence (AEL) in terms of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 
(AQA),503 and specifically exclude activities that require a waste management licence (WML) 
in terms of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008 (Waste Act).504 
Notwithstanding the explicit exclusion of waste management activities from the LN, it was 
incorrectly held in Interwaste (Pty) Limited and others v Coetzee and others505 that s24G also 
applied to the Waste Act.  
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In addition to the apparent extension to s24F(1)(b), the Amendment Act now expands 
s24G to apply to the commencement of waste management activities without Waste Act 
WMLs.506  No explanation is given for the singling out of WMLs from all other authorisations – 
the majority of which are not covered by the LN. This expansion is unwarranted and is likely to 
lead to expectations and create vested interests which will be difficult to reverse in subsequent 
amendments.507 
 
 The Air Quality Amendment Bill, 2013 proposes the introduction of a s24G equivalent 
into the AQA (section 22A) for circumstances where an activity listed in terms of section 21 of 
AQA is commenced without an AEL. However, activities requiring an AEL are already 
contained in the LNs and therefore require NEMA authorisation. Section 22A would mean that 
two applications are needed: one in terms of s24G for commencing a NEMA-listed activity 
without authorisation; and one in terms of AQA (generally to the municipality as licensing 
authority) for commencing an AQA-listed activity without authorisation. This duplication 
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions by different authorities on related ‘rectification’ 
applications.508  
 
S24G should not have been extended. However, having regard to lessons drawn from 
C&E theory and the two foreign jurisdictions, a true administrative penalty system should be 
available at least for those violations of NEMA and SEMAs which are not sufficiently egregious 
to require criminal sanctions.509 As has been done in both the UK and the Netherlands, it is 
advisable initially to the pilot the use of administrative penalties for particular offences.510 
 
Apart from criminal penalties,511 an administrative penalty should be in addition to any 
other NEMA/SEMA penalty, and should only be imposed once per violation – as per the 
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Netherlands and the UK. Provision for payment should include provision for: early payment 
discounts; interest; and penalty enforcement.512 
 
4.2.4 Institutional arrangements 
The decision-maker on s24G applications and administrative fines is the CA – the Minister or 
the relevant MEC. A person who has contravened s24F(1)(a) initiates the s24G process – 
although this is often on instruction from the EMI - by making an application. On application, 
the Minister or MEC ‘may’ direct, inter alia, the compilation of a report and the provision of 
additional information. Although s24G uses ‘may’, the Minister and MECs apparently take the 
view that there is no discretion regarding the acceptance of a s24G application. However, 
some offences are so egregious that they cannot be ‘rectified’ and should never be considered 
for ex post facto authorisation. In these cases, the authority should refuse to process the 
application.513 
 
S24G contains no details as to how or by when a decision regarding an administrative 
fine is made, nor is there any publicly available guidance in this regard. There is general 
unease about the lack of transparency in the fine calculation, giving rise to concerns about 
corruption.514 As set out in 4.2.5 below, the CER only recently learned of the factors that are 
considered in determining such fines. The Amendment Act515 makes provision for regulations 
to be prepared that relate to the procedure and criteria to be followed in the determination of a 
s24G administrative fine,516 and provides that the ‘existing standard operating procedure 
adopted by the Minister’ for determining s24G fines applies in the interim.517  Whilst there is no 
difficulty in setting out the procedure and criteria for s24G fines in regulations, the DEA should 
make these regulations available for public comment as soon as possible, as it is clear from its 
implementation that the ‘standard operating procedure’ is wholly inadequate. 
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For the introduction of a true administrative penalty system for SA environmental law, 
such penalties should be imposed by a specialist environmental authority (as in the UK and 
the Netherlands), with officials who are properly trained in the use of administrative penalties, 
including the discretionary evaluation of VMP factors.518 The EMI – which has environmental 
expertise, understands the impact of violations, and is familiar with the technical aspects and 
particular circumstances of offenders – could potentially fulfil this role.519 
 
As in the UK, for both s24G and a conventional administrative penalty system, and in 
order for regulated entities and the public to know what action can be expected from a 
regulator,520 there must be publicly-available guidance on administrative penalties, which is 
updated,521 and into which IAPs have input.522 All decisions should be made with due regard 
to the decision-maker’s policies and this guidance.523 
 
4.2.5 Decision-making processes 
There is no requirement in s24G that a person who has commenced a listed activity illegally 
must cease the activity, pending the application’s determination. Instead, the unlawful activity 
is apparently generally permitted to continue, while the various reports and studies are 
underway.524 The explanatory memorandum to the National Environmental Management Laws 
Second Amendment Bill [B13-2012] (NEMLAB 2) states that the DEA has received numerous 
complaints that ‘applicants proceed with illegal activities on the assumption that their 24G 
applications will be successful’.  
 
The Amendment Act provides the Minister or MEC with powers to issue directives for 
several reasons – in addition to the existing s24G powers to direct the compilation of a report 
and provision of other information.525 One of these is a directive to cease the activity 
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immediately, pending a decision on the application.526 This is discretionary, unlike the CER’s 
proposal that an applicant be required immediately to stop the unlawful activity and mitigate its 
impacts.527 The decision-maker could also, for example, direct the applicant to: remedy the 
activity’s adverse environmental impacts; cease, modify or control any act or omission causing 
pollution or degradation; and/or eliminate and/or contain or prevent the movement of pollution 
or degradation.  
 
S24G is, effectively, a short-cut procedure for authorisation528 -  not only does it 
permit less stringent environmental assessment and public participation processes than the 
normal authorisation process, but the public participation process is not clear.529 The 
preparation of a report is apparently not even a prerequisite to the application’s consideration 
– it is just one of the directives available. An applicant so directed is only required to describe 
the public participation process, and how IAPs’ comments were addressed.530 The 
Amendment Act attempts to make the environmental assessment aspect more robust by 
indicating that the report should also: describe the activity’s need and desirability;531 and 
assess the manner in which the geographical, physical, biological, social, economic and 
cultural aspects of the environment may be impacted.532 There is still, however, no provision 
to consider alternatives to the activity, which is a crucial aspect required by NEMA and the EIA 
Regulations, 2010.533 
 
After the application is received, the report compiled and it and other required 
information made available (and other directives potentially issued), the applicant is required 
to pay an administrative fine determined by the CA (which cannot exceed R5 million) before 
the Minister or MEC can consider the documents submitted and decide whether or not to 
issue authorisation.534 There is no publicly available list of factors to be considered by the 
decision-maker, nor any specific provision for an applicant to make representations in this 
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regard. In fact, the CA is apparently required to make the decision before the information is 
considered, and therefore without having regard to its contents. It is consequently not clear 
what information is taken into account by the decision-maker. As set out above, it is essential 
that the draft regulations on s24G fines are urgently made available for public comment. 
 
In May 2013, the DEA advised the CER that environmental authorities had developed, 
for internal use, a calculator to guide the determination of s24G fines, based on the following 
indices: social benefit that may accrue from the development; socio-economic and biodiversity 
impact that may result from the development; the development’s impact on the sense of 
place/heritage significance of the environment within which it is situated; and the pollution that 
has occurred or which may occur if mitigation measures fail. The calculator allows for a 
standard application of impact scores linked to the activity’s potential environmental risk (a 
more severe impact means a higher impact score). The impact score is determined after a 
review of, inter alia, any additional information requested from the applicant, DEA inspection 
findings, and any other relevant information. The applicant’s compliance history is also taken 
into account in making a final fine determination.535 
 
As indicated above, the vast majority of s24G applications succeed.536 Prior to its 
amendment, s24G did not make explicit provision for the application to be refused - it provided 
two options for the Minister or MEC after determination and payment of the administrative fine, 
and consideration of the report: direct the applicant to cease the activity and rehabilitate the 
environment; or issue an authorisation. The amended s24G(2) empowers the authority to: 
refuse to issue authorisation; issue authorisation (which only takes effect from the date of 
issue); or direct the applicant to provide more information or take certain steps before a 
decision is made. The Amendment Act also provides that, as part of this decision, the 
authority may direct the applicant to rehabilitate the environment; or take other necessary 
steps,537 and that an applicant’s failure to comply with a s24G(1) or (2) directive may be taken 
into account.538  
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As ‘administrative action’ (as defined in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (PAJA)), administrative penalties must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, 
and anyone whose rights are adversely affected is entitled to written reasons.539 To ensure fair 
administrative action, and in keeping with the lessons distilled from the UK and the 
Netherlands, decisions on s24G administrative fines and conventional administrative penalties 
should only be made after the offender has had an opportunity to make representations 
regarding the imposition of the penalty and the mitigating and aggravating factors, and these 
have been carefully considered.540   
 
The consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors by the decision-maker 
allows for the optimal administrative penalty to be determined.541 Insofar as s24G is 
concerned, the factors apparently considered in determining the fine are insufficient. Both for 
s24G and a conventional administrative penalty system, the factors to be evaluated should at 
least include those used in the UK for determining a VMP.542 
 
Having considered the procedure in the other jurisdictions, when the offender is 
notified of the fine imposition, it should be in writing, containing reasons and the relevant 
legislative provisions, and the offender advised of details like: the payment deadline; 
consequences of non-payment; and the appeal right (and how and where to lodge an 
appeal).543 FMPs could be imposed by more junior staff members, but senior officials – and 
not inspectors – should decide VMPs.544 
 
4.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta 
Before its recent amendment, s24G indicated that the maximum administrative fine was R1 
million per offence. It seems, however, that this maximum amount was really – if ever – 
imposed.545 S24G fines were simply too low to amount to a proper disincentive for non-
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compliance: companies budgeted for the fine and proceeded with their contraventions. If they 
were discovered, they applied for rectification.546 Even if the maximum fine of R1 million were 
usually imposed, this was a very small amount compared to the benefit of not having to follow 
the proper authorisation route. The maximum fine was also well below the cost of following 
EIA process and only one-fifth of the maximum criminal penalty in s24F.547 
 
It has been suggested that the s24G fine be linked to a meaningful percentage of the 
activity’s commercial value.548 The CER has proposed that, where a juristic person has 
unlawfully commenced an activity, it should be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding 
the greater of: ten per cent of the person’s annual turnover in SA and its exports during the 
preceding financial year; or R10 million.549  
 
The Amendment Act increased the maximum s24G fine to R5 million.550 Whilst an 
increase is supported, R10 million is more appropriate.551 When the fine is determined, the CA 
must consider all relevant factors.552 The Amendment Act553 increased the penalty for s24F 
violations from a maximum fine of R5 million to a maximum fine of R10 million and/or ten 
years’ imprisonment.554 The s24G administrative fine is therefore half the fine for s24F 
offences. The increased s24F fine is more in keeping with the fact that many offenders are 
corporate entities, and that substantial benefits can accrue to an offender who commences an 
activity without authorisation. It is also in line with penalties for similar SEMA offences.555  
 
Having considered the position in the UK and the Netherlands, it is recommended 
that, for a true administrative penalty system, the maximum amounts of both FMPs and VMPs 
should be prescribed in legislation. FMPs should be for fixed amounts, and, since 
administrative penalties are generally intended for offences which do not warrant criminal 
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prosecution, maximum VMPs should not exceed the maximum criminal fine. As in the UK, if, 
having evaluated the appropriate fine using the relevant factors, it would be higher than the 
maximum criminal fine, the violator should instead be prosecuted.556 
 
4.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds 
The fact that the s24G administrative fine is paid to the department implementing it has 
resulted in a system of perverse incentives, ensuring that the vast majority (if not all) s24G 
applications succeed.557 
 
Funds (from s24G and true administrative penalties) should not be available to the 
regulator that imposed the fine.558 As is the position with Competition Act administrative 
fines,559 these should be paid into the National Revenue Fund,560 controlled by National 
Treasury.561  
 
4.2.8 Appeal and review procedures 
NEMA provides that there is an appeal to the Minister562 or MEC563 of any decision by anyone 
acting under a NEMA or SEMA power delegated by the Minister or MEC, respectively. This 
means that appeals of both s24G fines and s24G decisions are available when the Minister or 
MEC delegates these decisions. If the Minister or MEC is the decision-maker, no appeal is 
available, but the decision can be taken on review to the High Court.  
 
An appeal panel can be appointed to advise the decision-maker.564 Importantly, the 
appeal does not suspend a decision, an authorisation or any of its provisions, or any directive, 
unless the Minister or MEC directs otherwise.565 The EIA Regulations provide that anyone 
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affected by the decision may submit a notice of intention to appeal to Minister or MEC within 
20 calendar days.566 If the appellant is not the s24G applicant, it must, within ten days, provide 
the applicant with the notice and advise where and for what period the appeal submission is 
available for inspection.  If the appellant is the applicant, it must provide each registered IAP 
with this information.567 The appeal must be submitted within 50 days of the decision.568 It 
must be in writing and accompanied by: the appeal grounds; supporting documentation not in 
the decision-maker’s possession; a statement of compliance with the notice of intention to 
appeal requirements; and any prescribed appeal fee.569 Any responding statement must be 
submitted within 30 days; and delivered to the appellant ten days thereafter. If there is new 
information in the responding statement, the appellant may submit an answering statement 
within 30 days, with a copy to the respondent ten days thereafter.570 In processing the appeal, 
the decision-maker must: acknowledge receipt of appeal/statements within ten days; and 
advise all parties of a suspension directive or an appeal panel’s appointment. The decision-
maker may also require additional information.571 Members of an appeal panel must be 
independent and the Minister or MEC must provide it with written instructions regarding the 
issues and the deadline for its written recommendations. If the panel introduces new 
information, each party may, within a period the panel determines, provide additional 
statements rebutting or supporting such new information.572 The decision-maker must make a 
final decision within 90 days of receipt of all relevant information, including a panel’s 
recommendations.573 The decision may confirm, set aside or vary the decision, or make any 
other appropriate decision.574 All parties must be notified of the decision and its reasons within 
ten days.575 
 
 A party aggrieved by: a s24G decision taken or fine imposed by the Minister or MEC; 
or the internal appeal outcome, can, within 180 days of the decision, apply to review the 
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decision in the High Court in terms of PAJA.576 Unless there are exceptional circumstances, 
internal remedies – like a NEMA appeal – must be exhausted before a PAJA review.577  
Possible review grounds include that: there was procedural unfairness; the decision was made 
— for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision, because irrelevant considerations 
were taken into account, in bad faith; or that the decision itself — contravenes a law, or was 
not rationally connected to: the purpose for which it was taken, or the information before the 
administrator.578 Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court governs review proceedings, which are 
initiated by the applicant submitting a notice of motion stating the decision for review, 
supporting by a founding affidavit containing the facts and circumstances upon which 
applicant relies.579 To oppose the relief, the relevant decision-maker may, within 15 days of 
receipt of the notice (or any amendment) deliver a notice of intention to oppose.580 Within the 
same period, the decision-maker must despatch to the registrar the record of the internal 
appeal proceedings, together with reasons from the decision-maker, and notify the 
applicant.581 The registrar makes the record available and the applicant furnishes the portions 
necessary for the review to the registrar and other parties.582 The applicant may, within ten 
days of the record’s availability, by delivery of a notice and accompanying affidavit, amend or 
vary the notice of motion and supplement the affidavit.583 Within 30 days thereafter, 
respondents may deliver answering affidavits.584 Rule 6 provides that, if new evidence is 
raised in the answering affidavit, the applicant may submit a replying affidavit within ten 
days.585 Within five days, the applicant can apply for a hearing date.586 Before the matter is 
argued, the court file must be indexed and paginated and heads of argument exchanged.587  
 
A review court can make any just and equitable order, including, inter alia: directing 
the administrator to — give reasons, act in a particular manner; setting aside the 
administrative action and: remitting the matter for reconsideration, or, in exceptional cases: 
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substituting the decision or correcting a defect resulting from it; directing the payment of 
compensation; declaring the parties’ rights; granting temporary relief like an interdict; or as to 
costs.588 
  
The High Court’s decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
(the highest appeal court except in constitutional matters)589 or to the Constitutional Court (the 
highest court in constitutional matters).590 
 
Having considered C&E theory and the position in the UK and the Netherlands, an 
appeal tribunal should be constituted of adjudicators with expertise in environmental 
matters.591 There is no special tribunal to dispute a s24G administrative fine. An Environment 
Tribunal could be established as the appeal tribunal for appeals of decision regarding 
administrative penalties (and potentially other environmental disputes). It might be possible to 
expand the existing Water Tribunal for this purpose.592 An Environment Appeal Tribunal could 
be established for higher appeals and its decisions should be appealable to the SCA.593 These 
tribunals should have the status of High Courts and have the power to set aside, replace, or 
confirm the contested decision. Records must be kept of all proceedings.594  
 
It is recommended that, as in the UK, appeal grounds are contained in legislation.595 
An appeal should, as a general rule – and unlike NEMA appeals – suspend the operation of 
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the decision, and should generally be public.  It can be a full re-hearing or only deal with a 
particular issue.596 In a FMP appeal, the regulator could initially conduct an internal review at 
which information is presented that it may not have seen before imposing the fine; following 
which, the decision can be upheld or reversed, or a lesser sanction imposed. There should be 
an option to appeal this decision to an appeal tribunal and parties can agree that the appeal 
will be determined on the papers.597 It is recommended, however, that a VMP appeal 
generally be conducted by an oral hearing.598 
 
Detailed record-keeping on administrative penalties is essential.599  In relation to 
publicising s24G fines, the NECERs contain some enforcement action details, but not enough 
to draw meaningful conclusions. This is compounded by the lack of reliable baseline evidence. 
In relation to s24G fines, for example, only the number and value of fines are provided.600 The 
value of each individual fine is not known, nor is the violator or the nature of the violation. The 
NECERs also do not indicate what enforcement action has been taken where s24G fines have 
not been paid.  
 
4.2.9 Effect of penalty on criminal offence 
Until its recent amendment, the heading of s24G was ‘rectification of unlawful commencement 
of activity’, but the word ‘rectification’ was not repeated in s24G; nor is it in the amended 
s24G. There has been uncertainty regarding the consequences of ‘rectification’, especially 
regarding criminal liability for the period between the activity’s illegal commencement and 
rectification, and regarding the admissibility in other proceedings of evidence from a s24G 
application.601  The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) argues that s24G creates a criminal 
prosecution indemnity, and that prosecuting a violator who follows the s24G process would 
amount to the offender being punished twice.602 It has been argued that, because the 
Legislature made provision for a criminal sanction (a fine), instead of a mere administrative fee 
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for processing the application, the payment halts s24F’s operation.603 The effect of these 
arguments is that, prior to s24G’s amendment, someone who illegally commenced a listed 
activity, and subsequently obtained ex post facto authorisation, was subject only to a 
maximum R1 million fine (and not imprisonment), rather than the s24F potential fine of R5 
million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.604 This interpretation has the result that payment of the 
fine indemnifies the offender from prosecution, even if the authority refuses to grant ex post 
facto authorisation and issues a directive to cease the activity. Payment of a fine means that 
the offender will not acquire a criminal record, and others involved in the offence and directors 
do not face prosecution.605 The NPA’s interpretation, coupled with the fact that s24G 
applications are very seldom – if ever – refused, means that violators have effectively been 
able to buy themselves out of criminal prosecution.606  
 
 It was held in Interwaste that a s24G rectification application suspends s24F’s penal 
provisions, and, by implication, any unlawfulness of the illegal activity. The court held that 
s24G provides for a moratorium against further action being taken against the applicant, 
pending the finalisation of the rectification application.607 Another argument in favour of the 
previous s24G creating a criminal prosecution indemnity, is that, unless it was so intended, 
there was very little incentive to follow s24G: an offender had to admit the offence, pay an 
administrative fine and remained liable to prosecution.608 
 
However, in the absence of an express contrary provision (of which there was none in 
s24G), it could not be implied that a successful s24G application created immunity for 
prosecution for past criminal conduct. There was also no indication in s24G that an 
authorisation operated retroactively to legitimate the activity. In fact, s24G does not deal with 
criminal liability – it deals with rectification of the unauthorised development, and the 
administrative fine is a penalty for seeking ex post facto approval; not a substitute for criminal 
sanctions. The idea of rectification is that something that was irregularly done can be cured. 
The past unlawfulness is, by the granting of s24G rectification, ‘rectified’, in that the 
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development that was illegally commenced was no longer unlawful. A substantial advantage 
of a successful s24G application is that there can be no order to demolish the development. 
But this rectification is not retrospective: when the listed activity was commenced, that was an 
offence. The subsequent authorisation does not retrospectively negate this past unlawful 
conduct or criminal liability:609 it merely regularises the activity prospectively.   
 
The NPA’s argument about an offender being punished twice for the same offence, is 
based on the criminal plea of autrefois convict. But so-called ‘double jeopardy’ only applies for 
criminal convictions and not administrative penalties. Every accused person has the right not 
to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously 
been either acquitted or convicted.610 In any event, the s24G fine is not punitive.611 As a result, 
payment of a s24G fine did not amount to a criminal conviction which prevented the offender 
from being criminally charged for unlawful commencement of the activity.612 
 
As set out above, the CER has proposed that an illegal activity be ceased, the 
damage mitigated, and the offender punished by criminal prosecution and/or an administrative 
penalty. After completion of the enforcement action, the offender can apply for authorisation. 
In this process, mitigating factors like: the company’s level of disclosure and cooperation with 
authorities, steps taken in mitigation, and a s24G or criminal fine payment should be 
considered in determining the administrative and/or criminal penalty.613 To avoid self-
incrimination, admissions in a s24G application should not be admissible as evidence in a 
prosecution.  
 
The Amendment Act makes clear that any s24G authorisation granted only takes 
effect from the date of issue – it is not retrospective.614 NEMLAB 2’s explanatory 
memorandum states that CAs have experienced a reluctance from the NPA to institute 
prosecutions once a person has applied for or received a s24G authorisation, and the 
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amendments ‘make it clear that criminal prosecution may still be instituted despite the fact that 
a person has applied for [authorisation] in terms of [s24G]’. The Amendment Act provides that 
neither the submission nor granting of a s24G application derogates from: the EMI’s or the 
South African Police Service’s authority to investigate any transgression; or the NPA’s legal 
authority to institute any criminal prosecution.615 It also provides that, if after the submission of 
a s24G application, it comes to the Minister or MEC’s attention that the applicant is under 
criminal investigation for the offence, it may defer a decision to issue an authorisation until the 
investigation is concluded and: the NPA has decided not to prosecute; the applicant is 
acquitted or found not guilty after prosecution; or the applicant has been convicted and has 
exhausted all appeal or review legal proceedings.616 
 
The payment of a s24G fine should also be included as one of the instances which 
will not derogate from the authority to investigate transgressions or criminal prosecution. The 
issue is not whether the NPA has legal authority to institute an application after an application 
is made or authorisation given – it is whether the application, fine or authorisation confers an 
indemnity from criminal liability for contravening NEMA. In other words, s24G should provide 
that neither the submission of the application, nor an authorisation, nor the payment of a s24G 
fine indemnifies the applicant from criminal liability. To be a proper disincentive for illegal 
commencement, the discretion for the Minister or MEC to ‘defer’ the decision to issue an 
authorisation while a criminal investigation is underway, must be an automatic suspension of 
the s24G process. Since the decisions made in the criminal prosecution and in the s24G 
application affect each other, they cannot run concurrently; if the offence justifies criminal 
prosecution, then this more serious enforcement process must take precedence. This will 
encourage speedy prosecution by authorities, and plea and settlement agreements with 
offenders who want access to rectification. In the circumstances, if a s24G applicant is under 
criminal investigation, the authority must defer a decision to issue an authorisation.617 
 
 Having evaluated the position in the UK and the Netherlands regarding a conventional 
administrative penalty system, as well as C&E theory, it is recommended that no criminal 
proceedings be instituted if liability for a monetary penalty has been discharged, or a FMP or 
                                                     
615  S.24G(6). 
616  S.24G(7). 





VMP imposed. If the violation amounts to a criminal offence and there is a realistic conviction 
prospect, the offence should be prosecuted. If criminal proceedings have been instituted or a 
criminal penalty imposed for the offence, an administrative penalty should not be imposed.618 
In other words, criminal and administrative penalties are alternatives to one another. However, 
because s24G is not a true administrative penalty, it is appropriate that payment of this 
‘administrative fine’ does not indemnify the violator from criminal prosecution. 
 
4.2.10 Non-compliance implications 
Before its amendment, s24G(3) provided that the failure to comply with: a directive to cease 
and rehabilitate; or a s24G authorisation condition, was an offence, for which the offender was 
liable to a maximum fine of R5 million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.619 The Amendment 
Act620 provides that the penalty for failing to comply with a directive or with an authorisation 
condition is a maximum fine of R10 million and/or a maximum imprisonment period of ten 
years.621 
 
Bearing in mind the lessons from the Netherlands and the UK, it is suggested that, for 
both s24G and the recommended administrative penalty system, interest accrues on unpaid 
fines. All decisions of regulators, appeal and higher appellate tribunals should be enforceable 
as if they were High Court orders.622  
 
 It appears from the discussion above that s24G fails to comply with any of the 
recommendations in Chapter 3. It should either be scrapped, or substantially amended as 
suggested above.  
 
There are no insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of a true administrative 
penalty for SA environmental law. The numerous advantages of such system over the criminal 
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sanction,623 and its success in other jurisdictions,624 illustrate the potential for administrative 
penalties to improve SA’s EC&E significantly. The EMI, which is already familiar with 
environmental law and violations could, with additional training, administer the system. The 
legislation would have to be amended to provide for such penalties, and guidance drafted 
regarding their implementation. A first step could be for the DEA and Department of Water 
Affairs to prepare a joint policy paper on the implementation of administrative penalties for 
water and environmental legislation. New institutions625 would have to be established626 to 
form the Environment and Environment Appeal Tribunals and presiding officers employed. An 
administrative penalty system would, however, relieve pressure on the State Attorney.627 
Another integral aspect to the success of administrative penalties is that they are supported 
politically and by industry.628 Given all of the advantages of these penalties - including a more 
proportionate response to violations629 and improved C&E630 – they are likely to receive this 
support. 
 
5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
SA’s environmental resources are in serious decline, although there is a constitutional 
environmental right, and multiple laws aimed at protecting the environment.631 As highlighted 
in Chapter 1, the reasons for this dire state of affairs include the fact that criminal punishment 
is the default method to enforce environmental laws.632 There would appear to be insufficient 
investigation and enforcement of environmental offences;633 and, even if a prosecutor 
succeeds in discharging the heavy burden of proof required to secure a criminal conviction, 
the fines imposed are simply too small to be an effective deterrent for the violation of 
environmental legislation. This is particularly the case when significant advantages – financial 
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and otherwise – result from non-compliance.634 The NECERs reveal that, year after year, 
several industries remain in non-compliance with the law, and/or commit further offences, 
despite enforcement action against them.635 It is clear that the current approach is failing to 
deter violations and to stem pollution and environmental degradation.636  
 
Effective EC&E is essential for environmental protection.637 As a possible means of 
improving the dismal state of EC&E in SA, this dissertation posits the introduction of an 
administrative penalty system into SA environmental law – with monetary fines imposed by 
administrative officials638 – on the basis that this has been successfully used in numerous 
other jurisdictions, with positive impacts on compliance with environmental law.639 There is 
currently no such system in environmental legislation – the ‘administrative fine’ in s24G of 
NEMA only triggers the Minister or MEC’s consideration of an application for ex post facto 
environmental authorisation.640 
 
If one considers C&E theory - addressed in Chapter 2 - there are multiple drawbacks 
of traditional C&E tools, and the criminal sanction in particular. Among other things, 
prosecution is expensive and time-consuming and requires well-capacitated enforcement 
authorities,641 specialist prosecutors and judges who understand the consequences of 
environmental violations.642 SA lacks this capacity.643 It is difficult to prove an offender’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt,644 and criminal courts are already significantly overloaded with 
serious criminal cases.645 Violating environmental law is generally not regarded as a moral 
wrong, and priority is given to ‘real’ crimes.646 A compliance deficit results from the fact that it 
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is difficult to obtain a criminal conviction and an adequate penalty: authorities are discouraged 
from prosecuting environmental crimes.647 
 
In contrast, there are numerous advantages associated with the use of administrative 
penalties. These penalties provide a more proportionate response to violations than the 
criminal sanction, as they take account of the financial benefit gained by non-compliance and 
the seriousness of the breach. They are more proportionate and transparent than criminal 
fines and, for VMPs, mitigating and aggravating factors are evaluated to determine the 
appropriate fine.648 Officials with specialised expertise impose these penalties,649 and the 
standard of proof – a balance of probabilities – is much easier to discharge.650 Administrative 
penalties are more informal than criminal proceedings, require fewer financial and human 
resources, and are less time-consuming.651 Offenders are less likely to dispute these fines, 
which lack the criminal conviction’s stigma and risk (including of a criminal record).652 The 
recipient of an administrative penalty can appeal to an independent tribunal - staffed by 
members with specialist environmental expertise653 -  instead of having to compete with other 
cases in the overburdened court system.654 
 
Building on this theoretical foundation and with a view to distilling a set of lessons for 
the improved formulation and application of administrative penalties to SA, Chapter 3 
evaluated the use of administrative environmental law penalties in the UK and in the 
Netherlands (respectively the roots of SA’s common and civil law legal systems). This 
evaluation highlighted how these two regimes differ in several respects in relation to: the 
nature of the penalties; their trigger and scope; institutional arrangements; fine quanta; 
allocation of fine proceeds; appeal and review procedures; their effect on criminal offences; 
and implications of non-compliance.  
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Against this context, Chapter 4 evaluated SA’s first attempt to introduce administrative 
penalties within its environmental regime; namely s24G of NEMA. This evaluation highlights 
that s24G fails to comply with several theoretical conditions and lessons drawn from 
successful regimes, such as those in operation in the Netherlands and the UK. These 
inconsistencies include the following: s24G is not an administrative penalty of the type 
discussed in Chapter 2 - it is paid to trigger the consideration of an application for ex post 
facto environmental authorisation when a person has commenced a listed or waste 
management activity without authorisation;655 no distinction is made between ‘innocent’, 
negligent and intentional offenders, and all such offenders can apply for ex post facto 
rectification;656 the Minister or MEC is the decision-maker; whereas in a true administrative 
penalty system, environmental officials administer the system and impose the fines;657 there is 
no publicly-available guidance as to how or by when a decision regarding an administrative 
fine is made,658 nor is there specific provision for an applicant to make representations 
regarding the fine659 - the factors that the DEA apparently considers in calculating s24G fines 
are insufficient;660 the fact that the s24G fine is paid to the implementing department creates 
the risk of perverse incentives to approve applications;661 there is no specialist tribunal to 
challenge s24G administrative fines;662 lodging an appeal does not suspend the challenged 
decision;663 and record-keeping and publicising of s24G fines is insufficient.664  
 
As a result, it is proposed that s24G either be scrapped entirely or substantially 
revised to meet the constitutional dictate of protecting the environment for the benefit of 
present and future generations.665 If domestic policy-makers elect to retain it, several key 
amendments are proposed, together with the introduction of a true administrative penalty 
system: s24G should be limited to negligent violations and its application should not have 
been extended to waste management activities - intentional offenders should be 
                                                     
655  Fn.477,489,506. 
656  Fn.492. 
657  Fn.15. 
658  Fn.514. 
659  4.2.5. 
660  Fn.542 
661  Fn.557. 
662  Fn.592. 
663  Fn.565. 
664  4.2.8; fn.600. 





prosecuted;666 a true administrative penalty system should be introduced into SA 
environmental law, for violations of NEMA and the SEMAs that are not serious enough to 
warrant criminal prosecution:667 FMPs should be available for minor infringements and strict 
liability offences, and VMPs for more serious offences;668 because criminal and administrative 
penalties are generally alternatives to one another, if, having evaluated the appropriate 
penalty using the relevant factors, it would be higher than the maximum criminal fine, the 
violator should instead be prosecuted (since s24G is not a true administrative penalty, it is 
appropriate that a successful s24G application does not preclude possible criminal 
prosecution);669 specialist environmental authorities should impose administrative penalties670 
if violations have been proved on a balance of probabilities;671 there should be publicly-
available guidance regarding the imposition of s24G fines and administrative penalties – 
including the mitigating and aggravating factors evaluated - so that regulated entities and 
members of the public know what action will be taken in response to violations;672 the factors 
to be evaluated should at least include those used in the UK for determining a VMP,673 and 
regulations regarding the procedure and criteria to determine a s24G fine should be published 
for comment as soon as possible;674 decisions on s24G administrative fines and conventional 
administrative penalties should only be made after careful consideration of submissions made 
by an offender regarding the penalty and the mitigating and aggravating factors;675 funds from 
s24G and administrative penalties should be paid to the National Revenue Fund and not to 
the implementing department;676 apart from criminal penalties, an administrative penalty 
should be in addition to any other NEMA/SEMA penalty, and only be imposed once per 
violation;677 specialist tribunals – with the status of High Courts - should be established to hear 
appeals of s24G fines and administrative penalties;678 appeals should suspend the operation 
of penalty decisions;679 administrative penalties should be enforceable as if they were High 
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Court orders;680 and detailed records must be kept of s24G fines and administrative penalties; 
including: the value of each fine; the violator; the violation; and what action has been or will be 
taken if the penalty is not paid.681  
 
Criminal sanctions are clearly failing to realise the constitutional right to an 
environment not harmful to health or well-being - there is widespread non-compliance with 
environmental legislation, and the state of the environment is deteriorating. The successful 
application of administrative penalties in other jurisdictions illustrates the significant potential 
of administrative penalties to improve SA’s EC&E. For the reasons explained in Chapter 4, 
s24G is not a particularly useful precedent for the introduction of such penalties. It is 
recommended that an administrative penalty system – structured with regard to the lessons 
learned from C&E theory and the use of these penalties in the UK and the Netherlands - be 
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